Top Quotes: “Crossroads: A Popular History of Malaysia and Singapore” — Jim Baker

Introduction

“Historically, as a result of this poor soil, Malaya was never able to support a very large population. As late as the turn of the nineteenth century, it was estimated that only 250,000 people lived in the peninsula.

Not all of Malaysia has poor soil. Parts of Kedah and Perlis, the Pahang River basin, the Kelantan River delta and the Kinabatangan River in Sabah are quite fertile, but they cover a relatively small area of the country.”

“Like other cultures, such as those in Latin America, with their afternoon siestas, and the Middle East, where life comes to a standstill during the hottest parts of the day, the traditional Malay lifestyle reflected an acceptance of the realities of nature. Among the Chinese immigrants and Europeans, this acceptance fed a stereotype that the Malays were lazy and easygoing. It is not that they did not work hard; rather, they just had a different view of when and how to work. Anyone who has experienced the backbreaking non-mechanized labor of padi (wet rice) farming knows that the stereotype is a myth, but it persists among some Singaporeans to this very day, perhaps to the point where they sometimes seriously underestimate the potential of their neighbors to the north.

The traditional Malay house is an example of the impact of geography on a way of life. It is built off the ground to avoid floods caused by heavy rain as well as the insects, snakes and animals that thrive in tropical climates. There are many windows, and the rooms open into one another to catch cooling breezes. A palm thatch roof absorbs the heat of the sun. Chinese immigrants did not copy this architectural style because they came from temperate climates. Chinese in the rural areas tended to live in houses built on the ground with cement floors and tin roofs. These living styles were similar to patterns in other parts of Southeast Asia. For example, in Laos there are two words for house, one for the traditional Southeast Asian house and another for the type built by immigrants from the north.

Further evidence of climatic influences can be found in the clothes people wear. The sarong (a skirt-like garment) is eminently practical for the circulation of air around the body and is worn by people throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In fact, the only place in Southeast Asia where a sarong of some type is not the national dress is Vietnam.”

“Prior to the settlement of coastal peninsular Malaysia, the area was inhabited by people who had been living there some 30,000 to 40,000 years. The descendants of these people, the Negritos, Senois, and Jakun (Proto-Malay), still live in the interior of the country and represent a population of about one hundred and fifty thousand. On the island of Borneo, indigenous groups, such as the Iban (Sea Dayak), Kadazandusun, Bidayuh (Land Dayak), Sama-Bajau, Murut and Melanau, make up almost half of the population of over 4.5 million people.”

“In those areas that were fertile, wet rice grew well because of the large amount of rainfall and the availability of river water.

Wet rice farming does not lend itself to mechanization, not even for harvesting, which is done stalk by stalk. Seedlings are first grown in nursery areas then transplanted by hand, shoot by shoot, into the soil. The fields must be continually flooded throughout the five-month cultivation period.”

“Most kampungs were relatively small, consisting of ten to twenty families. The ability to get along with neighbors was important to status in the community. The economic survival of the group was dependent on cooperation. Good manners were essential, and they became an important part of the Malay value system. Behavior or language that was confrontational or abusive was considered bad form in the kampung. The feeling was that they had to live and work together and thus could not afford vendettas or ill will, at least in public.

If you wish to insult someone in English or Chinese, you accuse them of unnatural sexual acts or compare them to parts of the body that are seen as unclean. The Malay language traditionally had little such vocabulary, although literal translations from English have crept into the language in the cities. The worst insult to most Malays is to be kurang ajar (lacking in manners). The phrase literally means “little teaching.” Its use as an idiom reflects the cooperation and courtesy of kampung life. While all education systems impart acceptable modes of behavior, to traditional Malays, manners are of utmost importance.

Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, in his book, The Malay Dilemma, claims that kampung culture created a society that valued form over substance and scorned assertiveness. As a result, when the group-oriented Malays were confronted with entrepreneurial cultures, such as the competitive immigrant Chinese, they were not able to achieve success in a modern capitalist economy. Ironically, these very values endeared the Malays to British civil servants.”

“A distinctly Malay form of madness is known as amok. The term is one of the few Malay words that has found its way into the English language.

Suppressing aggression, frustration and anger was and still is important in Malay public behavior. Emotions must be controlled lest they impair relationships in the community and cause social disharmony. Periodically, this pressure becomes too great for an individual to bear, but to break away from the constraints of village society, the individual must choose insanity. Loss of honor, misfortune or tragedy sets him off, and he goes into a killing frenzy, attacking people around him indiscriminately.”

Origins

“Another characteristic of traditional Malay rural society was the high status accorded to women.”

“Minangkabau society was matriarchal in most respects. Land ownership was passed from wife to daughter. As opposed to most societies, it was imperative for families to have daughters in order to ensure inheritance. When a couple married, the husband joined his wife’s family and kampung. Women in Minangkabau villages could vote for tribal chiefs, and if their husbands divorced them, they received custody of the children.

The majority of adat systems throughout the peninsula was patriarchal, but even in these systems, high status was accorded to women. In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of the archipelago immigrants to Malaya were Bugis, whose women had equal rights to property, participated in public affairs and government and on occasion, were elected leaders of their communities. In Aceh, women traditionally enjoyed property rights equal to men, and four consecutive rulers were women in the seventeenth century. This ended in 1699 in part because an edict from Mecca condemned rule by women as contrary to Islamic principles, but women continued to have a large degree of control over family finances, run businesses and even take employment outside the home.”

“There are a number of reasons why the villages of Malaya embraced this foreign religion and forsook many of their animistic beliefs.

One reason was the Muslim belief in the community and equality of believers. Given the nature of kampung life and its sense of group-directed behavior, Islam was seen as a faith that bound the village even closer together and offered clearly delineated codes of behavior. It also emphasized the already existing desire for consensus and harmony.

As time went on, Islam not only provided greater unity for the village but also helped to create a sense of racial identity.”

“Another attraction was Islam’s belief in predestination. For rural people, whose lives were controlled by the cycles and whims of nature and were already fatalistic, the idea of one God directing the daily fate of each member of society had great appeal. This was an aspect of the uncomplicated nature of Islam that was not evident in other religions and beliefs to which they had been exposed. The numerous gods in Hinduism, together with the stratified society it offered and its endless cycle of rebirth, did not appeal. Neither did the metaphysical aspects of Buddhism. Islam was a religion that was relatively easy to understand because it fit their society.

It would seem that Islam would be in direct conflict with many traditional Malay beliefs, but the Malays found ways to accommodate the two. The Islam that came to Malaya had already passed through India and Indonesia and thus was somewhat more accommodating and adaptable to the local culture than the Islam of the Middle East. Islam weakened adat law but did not replace it. Islamic beliefs in punishment – for example, an eye for an eye and dismemberment for theft – were toned down to conform to village ways. Islamic beliefs in polygamy, divorce on demand for males and the separateness of women in religion, such as segregation of the sexes in mosques, tended to give women a secondary role. In the archipelago, women were too important in society to accept these subservient roles. Therefore, for the most part, women continued to retain property rights and take part in public affairs, albeit in diminished roles. After the coming of Islam, Malay women still had a much higher status than women in China or India.”

“Contradictions still remain. Prior to the coming of Islam, the Malays had a strong belief in the spirit world. Misfortune was caused by evil spirits or ghosts, and most communities had a medicine man (a bomoh or shaman), who provided amulets and conducted ceremonies to protect villagers from disaster. These animistic beliefs persist to this very day. Malaysians continue to employ bomohs to guarantee good weather for weddings and golf tournaments and sometimes to exorcise evil spirits. As recently as 2004, government officials asked several bomohs to help them locate a missing helicopter in the jungle. These are enduring reminders that after Indianization, Islamization, colonialization, industrialization and globalization, kampung culture still survives.”

“The evolution of Malay society from small scattered settlements into organized political states partially came about as a result of borrowing heavily from India. This process of Indianization was experienced by all the countries of Southeast Asia, except Vietnam and to a lesser degree, the Philippines.

In the first two centuries of the first millennium, a number of factors contributed to an Indian penetration of Southeast Asia. The first was a decline in trade involving China, India and the Mediterranean. Rome had a seriously unfavorable balance of trade with India and China, in which gold was exchanged for cotton, glass and carpets from India and silk and porcelain from China. In the first century CE, Rome banned the export of gold coins, and its trade with the East declined. As Rome weakened and then fell apart, Persians and Arabs replaced the Indians as middlemen in the East-West trade. China solved this problem through conquest in central Asia and Vietnam and through the use of overland trade routes. India looked east, searching for new trading partners. Indian sailors were willing to venture away from shore, while the Chinese had little inclination at that time to trade by sea. Increased trade and contacts between India and Southeast Asia stimulated the demand for products from the area, such as spices and gold, as well as jungle produce, such as rattan, camphor, resin and hardwood. This process accelerated over time as Buddhism and later, Islam grew in popularity in India. Both these faiths offered their Hindu converts the means to circumvent the strict Hindu caste system that denied social mobility unless one belonged to the appropriate caste.”

“Over time, trade and cultural contacts between the Malay world and India had a profound impact on the people of the archipelago, especially on those who lived near trading centers. Prior to the increase in trade between the archipelago and India, Malays lived in small, close-knit villages. Leadership consisted of village chieftains and medicine men. Their uncomplicated society did not require a sophisticated infrastructure. With trade came large settlements at the river mouths and diverse populations that were no longer bound by family or clan. Trade also created a monetary economy and new forms of wealth. These economic and demographic changes demanded a mature form of government, which in turn led to social stratification.

The political leadership of Malay society was amenable to the economic benefits of adopting Indian culture, as well as the Indian ceremonies and customs that set royalty apart from the common people. Indian royal models and Hinduism, which gave them religious and moral authority, transformed Malay chieftains into god-kings, who were reincarnations of Hindu gods and had a divine right to rule.”

“The Malays did not have a written language until modern government and international trade made it necessary. With Indianization came a written language and a dramatic increase in the Malay vocabulary.

Prior to the industrial and technological revolutions, over half the words in the Malay language had their roots in Sanskrit, the language brought by Indian traders; priests and entrepreneurs. Sanskrit formed the basis of written Malay and provided the vocabulary needed for dialogue, positions in government, products and laws as well as abstract thought, for which historian Richard Winstedt claims Malay had no vocabulary until the time of Indianization. Even when Islam became the predominant Malay religion, much of the religious vocabulary had Indian roots. Many scholars believe that this was because Islam came by way of India. Similar adaptations of vocabulary took place centuries later when the Malays needed words for European technology, products and political systems. Some historians claim that there are few indigenous words in the Malay language, most of them having been borrowed from other languages as a result of Malaya’s position in world trade.”

“In the seventh century, the empire of Srivijaya rose out of the kingdom of Palembang in the southeaster part of Sumatra, and for four or five centuries was the preeminent power in the Sunda and Melaka Straits. Its rise was paralleled by the growth of powerful agrarian kingdoms in central Java. In the ninth century, Srivijaya and these Javanese states apparently came together under the mysterious Sailendra dynasty, creating an empire that controlled an area from southern Thailand to the eastern Indonesian archipelago.”

“Shrivijaya was an Indianized state with its capital originally at Palembang and later at Jambi (Melayu) in today’s Indonesia. Its court ceremonies and legal system reflected the influence of India, and most of the ruling class had accepted Mahayana Buddhism from Indian missionaries and traders. Visiting Chinese pilgrims and scholars commented on the high standard of Buddhist learning and practice in the kingdom. Some historians credit Srivijaya with one of the first applied uses of the zero.

From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the power and prestige of Srivijaya declined. Chola, a Tamil empire in southern India, was a prime competitor for control of the East-West trade, and in the eleventh century it conducted a series of devastating raids along the coasts of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, from which Srivijaya never fully recovered. Second, in the thirteenth century, China reduced its trade because of isolationist policies, and Srivijaya was hit hard. Majapahit, a kingdom from eastern Java with a more diversified economy because it had a significant agricultural industry as well as being a trading power, incorporated Sumatra into its empire.

Srivijaya is an important part of Malay history, especially evidenced by the story of the origins of Malay royalty earlier in this chapter. Many Malays believe Srivijaya is the forerunner of the Melaka Sultanate. The ties across the Straits of Melaka go deep in terms of people – immigrants have crossed over from Sumatra throughout Malay/Malaysian history; culture – the origins of much adat law come from Sumatra, as did Islam later in history; and language – the modern Malay language probably has its roots in Srivijaya. It was the language of commerce adopted by most of the coastal ports in the straits.”

“Srivijaya was absorbed by Majapahit sometime in the fourteenth century. Many in the old royal families resented the takeover, and it is unlikely there was much loyalty to the empire from Malays and their maritime allies, especially those from southeastern Sumatra and the islands south of Singapore – the Riau and Lingga archipelagos. It is out of this discontent that emerged the greatest of the pre-modern Malay sultanates – Melaka.”

“One explanation of how Temasek was renamed Singapore comes from the legend that the Palembang Malays discovered on the island a great beast that resembled the singa (three-colored lion) from Hindu mythology. Together with the Hindu word pura, which means “city,” the name Singapura came into being. A more likely story is that court historians changed the name in the Malay Annals to glorify Malay royalty. The historians did not want the founder of the Melaka Sultanate and the holder of the Lion Throne to have ruled a place with a name as mundane as Temasek (literally “sea town”).”

“For about a century, from the turn of the fifteenth century until 1511, Melaka played an important role in the trade of Europe, the Middle East, India, China and the archipelago.”

“The Chinese who settled in Melaka in the fifteenth century were the forefathers of a distinctly Malayan Chinese community, the Peranakans. This minority within the Chinese community has deeper roots in Malaya than the vast majority of Chinese who arrived there in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unlike the later immigrants, the first wave of Chinese did not live apart from the indigenous community. Instead, they incorporated a Malay dimension into their culture.

The Chinese males who married Malay women created the first generation of Peranakans. The female children from these unions were not allowed to marry Malays and became a pool of wives for Chinese men. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Dutch census figures showed some two thousand living in Melaka.

While racially predominantly Chinese, this group adopted many Malay customs. Its unique Peranakan patois developed as a mixture of Hokkien and Malay. Peranakan cuisine borrowed spices, curries and coconut milk from Malay cuisine and combined them with Chinese recipes. Peranakan women adopted the sarong as their main dress and wore blouses that retained some Chinese influence. Women in the Peranakan community enjoyed greater power and freedom than they did in China, especially in economic matters.

Even some of the Chinese culture they retained was modified from that of China. Chinese religion became a Peranakan religion, in which great emphasis was placed on the ceremonies connected with funerals, festivals and ancestor worship.

With the arrival of the British, the Peranakans were absorbed into the larger Straits Chinese community.”

“Melaka also courted the friendship of the Muslim rulers and traders of India, the Middle East and the archipelago. In fact, in the 1430s, when it became apparent that China was once again becoming isolationist, Parameswara’s grandson, Muhammad Shah, made a sudden conversion to Islam. He realized his political survival depended on new alliances. His conversion was the result of a dream in which an angel appeared, and when he woke, he could quote the holy Koran word for word.

Ordinary Malays converted to Islam because it provided unity and a sense of identity, but the leaders in the business community initially converted for political and economic reasons as well. Within Melaka, a large number of people involved in business were already Muslims, each with his own shahbandar. The trade that stretched from the Mediterranean to the Spice Islands (the Moluccas) was controlled by Muslim Arabs, Muslim Persians and Muslim Indians, and Melaka’s economic livelihood depended on close and trusting relations with these people.

The coastal areas of the archipelago underwent a period of rapid conversion to Islam. Across the straits in Sumatra, states such as Aceh and Pasai had already embraced Islam. The Javanese, who controlled much of the spice trade as well as being an important source of food for Melaka, forsook their Hindu and Buddhist traditions.”

“Tun Perak held office from 1456 to 1498. During this period, Melaka became an aggressive political and military power. Melaka’s forces successfully held off Siamese advances and conquered most of the Malay Peninsula, large areas of Sumatra and the islands south of Singapore. This was the era of the legendary warriors, such as Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat.

As long as Melaka had strong leaders, its infrastructure worked. Without them, there were inherent flaws that eventually brought about the fall of the sultanate in the early sixteenth century. By drawing foreigners to its capital, Melaka amassed great wealth but was unable to develop a loyal base of citizens. When Melaka was threatened by the Portuguese, the traders left for other ports. In addition, few among those in the indigenous population benefited from the power and prosperity and thus were not inclined to defend the port. Melaka produced little of its own, especially food, and was dependent on the sale of services to buy food. If trade was interrupted, it spelled doom.”

“The Indians did not make any serious attempts to translate trade into political dominance.

The archipelago’s experience with China was even less dramatic. Between 1403 and 1430, the Chinese sent seven maritime expeditions into Southeast Asia. Each carried 27,000 men, but there was no attempt at conquest, except the occasional altercations at sea, nor any attempt to influence the culture of the area. Chinese culture was not easily exportable. Its philosophy/ religion was deeply embedded in race and tradition. The mixture of Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism and ancestor veneration was hard to graft onto another culture without a revolutionary change in the social system. The Chinese also felt that China was the center of the world, and other nations could not possibly achieve its sophisticated culture.”

European Colonization

“This great empire brought much wealth to Portugal. To give an example, $45 worth of spices bought in the Celebes could be sold for $1,800 in Lisbon.

However, the Portuguese never fully achieved their original objectives to control the straits, achieve wealth and convert Muslims. Portugal was a small country and its trading empire was too far flung. It was never able to control the straits completely because its navy did not have sufficient ships in the area. As a result, Melaka under Portuguese rule spent most of its history fighting off attacks by the Javanese, the Acehnese and the Johor Malays in 1513, 1537, 1539, 1547, 1551, 1568, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1586, 1587, 1606, 1616, and 1639. They were fortunate that the Acehnese and the people of Johor disliked each other and so did not join forces against Portugal. The Portuguese fortress, A Famosa (The Famous), with its eight-foot walls, made it possible to hold off the attacks until help arrived from Goa or the Spice Islands.

Portuguese Melaka never achieved its goal of becoming a trading center for a number of reasons. The Portuguese had originally intended to recreate the system and services provided by the former sultanate, but Melaka did not attract Portugal’s best and brightest administrators. Most of the Portuguese who went there were military men and soldiers of fortune. The result was a system run by barely literate men that was rife with corruption.”

“Portugal failed to convert people to Christianity; in fact, its efforts were counterproductive. Their ruthless treatment of the Muslims drove them away from Christianity. Islam became a rallying call for those opposed to European intervention, and the faith grew as a result. Great missionaries, such as Francis Xavier, gave of their best in Melaka but left in frustration. The only converts were the wives and children of the locals who married Portuguese sailors and soldiers. The descendants of these people and a few Portuguese words in the Malay language are the only lasting heritage of the Portuguese presence in Melaka.

The impact of the Malay world’s first encounter with a European power was essentially negative. Portugal ended the Melaka Sultanate and its efforts to create greater political and cultural Malay unity. Although Johor would continue the royal lineage of Melaka, the Malay political world was moving toward political fragmentation, which would make the area vulnerable to further European expansionism. The presence of aggressive outside powers, such as the Portuguese, disrupted and dissipated the wealth that the peninsula derived from its strategic position in the East-West trade. Portuguese rule in the area was an sign of things to come.”

“Aceh reached the height of its power under the rule of Sultan Iskandar Muda, who reigned from 1607 to 1636. During this time, it extended its control over most of the Malay Peninsula, capturing Pahang in 1617 and sending one thousand of its inhabitants to Aceh as slaves. The Acehnese seized Kedah in 1619 and created refugees of the royal family of Johor by repeated sackings of their capital. All that stood in the way of Sultan Iskandar and the recreation of an empire on the scale of Srivijaya and Melaka was the Portuguese garrison.

In 1629, Aceh assembled an army of twenty thousand men and two hudred ships to conquer Melaka. This was an incredibly large force for a trading empire, and Iskandar threw a large portion of his resources into this battle for the straits. His troops fought almost to the heart of the city, but reinforcements arrived from Goa in time to tip the scales. In the Portuguese counter-attack, the Acehnese suffered huge losses. Estimates by historians on the number of Acehnese killed vary from ten thousand to nineteen thousand – devastating numbers.

This debacle and the wars that preceded it decimated a generation of young Acehnese and forced Aceh’s withdrawal from many of its conquered lands. Although their power was checked, the Acehnese had built a reputation as a strong and self-sufficient people, devout in their religion and fearless in battle. In the nineteenth century, when the Netherlands extended its control over what is known as Indonesia today, Aceh was the last to be subjugated. The Dutch fought a 25-year war with Aceh (1873-1898) and never really established effective control over these people.”

“After the Portuguese captured Melaka, Sultan Ahmad and his father beat a hasty retreat to Pahang. Mahmud, having observed his son’s ineptitude in crises with the Portuguese and upset with Ahmad’s deviant and toadying entourage, eventually had him murdered and reclaimed the throne, not trusting the future of the Melaka royal family in Ahmad’s hands.”

“In the three-way competition for control of the straits and trade in the western archipelago among Aceh, Johor and Portugal, Johor was constantly on the losing end. It has been said that Johor’s capital was burned down so often that the followers of the sultan became construction experts by rebuilding it.”

“Aceh controlled the Sunda Straits, and the Portuguese stood in the way of Dutch trading ambitions. Thus, in 1639, the Dutch joined forces with Johor to attack Melaka. As a result of the fighting spirit of their soldiers and the strength of A Famosa, the Portuguese held out for almost two years until they finally surrendered in 1641.”

“This alliance with the Dutch was a learning experience for the people of Johor. They had planned to re-occupy Melaka after the Portuguese defeat and reestablish the Malay Empire. The Dutch wanted control of the straits and were not interested in Johor’s plans. It began to dawn on the local powers that the Dutch objective was to monopolize trade, and anyone who interfered was bound to feel the wrath of their sea power.

However, the Dutch had little interest in the political affairs of the peninsula other than in Melaka, and as Johor expanded its influence northward, they were perfectly happy to stay out of the way. Friendly relations with Johor were in the interests of the Dutch because of the havoc Johor’s sailors could wreck on Dutch shipping.

As a result of Dutch victory over the Portuguese and the check they placed on the weakening Acehnese, the people of Johor were able to move their capital back to the mainland and reestablish the kingdom along the Johor River under the leadership of Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah II (1623–1677).

Over the next fifty years, Johor was once again the strongest power on the peninsula. It reestablished influence over much of what had been Melaka’s territory and made alliances with sultanates in Sumatra. The Johor River and Riau once again became important entrepôts.

Although much of the trade was with the Dutch, there are numerous accounts of a bustling, successful trading economy that was the outlet for Malayan pepper, hardwood, camphor, rattan and tin. That Johor could achieve this after its losses to Aceh and Portugal was because of the system of government inherited from Melaka.

If Johor had not become involved in a disastrous war with Jambi in Sumatra in 1673, it might have remained a prosperous kingdom with economic and political inde-pendence. The war was a result of royal marriage politics.”

“Two of the largest ports in the world today are Singapore and Rotterdam. By collecting and selling the goods of other countries, both have used their geographical locations to become centers of trade. Rotterdam sits at the mouth of the Rhine River, which flows from the North Sea through the heart of western Europe to Switzerland. The Dutch made their living on the trade that flowed up and down this river. They also worked as coastal traders and fishermen in the Baltic Sea and the English Channel. The sea and trade were vital aspects of their economy.

In the sixteenth century, the Netherlands was part of the Catholic Spanish Empire. When the Protestant Reformation took place in Europe, many Dutch left the Catholic Church and became Protestant, which in turn led to a Dutch rebellion against Spain. In 1580, the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal merged, and the Spanish crown, in an attempt to bring the rebellious Dutch in line, closed the port at Lisbon to Dutch traders and shipping. This threatened the economic lifeblood of the Netherlands. While the Portuguese and Lisbon were the source of products from the East, the Dutch were the distributors of these products in western Europe. The ban on access to some of their most lucrative trade became a primary motivation in the Dutch desire to cut out the middleman and seize control of the commerce from the East, especially that of the archipelago.”

“Many Dutch sailors had traveled with the Portuguese to the East and had learned Portuguese navigational and sailing methods. During these voyages, the Dutch had also observed that Portuguese control over their trading empire was weak. The secret was out – Portugal was vulnerable and unable to defend its far-flung empire. This knowledge and Dutch advances in naval technology gave them the tools to challenge Portuguese trade between Europe and Asia. Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century, a mixture of nationalism, economic necessity and maritime knowledge created a new player in the trade of the archipelago – one much more formidable than the Portuguese.”

“Demand for tin in Europe and China had risen rapidly, and Bugis control over most of the tin-producing areas in the peninsula threatened Dutch access to and control of this lucrative commerce. The Bugis/Malay entrepôt in Riau was a thriving concern, which drained trade away from Batavia. What the Dutch saw as Bugis piracy also contributed to increased confrontations. At heart, most of the Bugis were warriors, and as Dutch shipping and trade increased, their ships were too tempting to ignore.

The combination of commercial competition and mayhem on the high seas drew the Dutch into armed conflict with the Bugis. In the 1750s and 1780s, actual warfare took place, culminating with a Bugis attack on Melaka in 1784. The Dutch victory and the ensuing counterattack seriously curtailed Bugis power and influence. Caught between the Dutch fleet and the walls of A Famosa, the Bugis incurred heavy losses. After their vịctory at Melaka, the Dutch attacked Selangor and forced the Bugis sultan to flee temporarily to the eastern coast.

They then attacked and occupied Riau, taking over the administration of the government. With the end of Bugis power in the peninsula, there was no longer a dominant local power. It is ironic that although the Dutch successfully destroyed Bugis power in the area, it was the British who benefited from it.”

“Between 1689 and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the British and French fought seven world wars, that is, wars that took place on multiple continents. It could be argued that World War I and World War II were misnomers – they were more like World Wars VIII and IX. Out of a period of 126 years, 80 years were consumed by all-out warfare. Some historians call this time period the Second Hundred Years’ War.

For the most part, the wars between these two competing mercantilist nations revolved around control of America and India. The conflict over northern America ended with the Seven Years’ War (known as the French and Indian War in the United States), when in 1763, the French were forced to cede Canada to the British. During the American Revolution (1775–1783), the French and Dutch allied with the colonies. Much of the conflict centered on trade in the East, especially around the Bay of Bengal.”

“It became imperative for Britain to establish naval bases in the archipelago. This change in policy was reinforced by the fact that in the following two wars – the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War – the French occupied the Netherlands and once again had access to the Dutch bases and fleet in the East.

Another reason for active British intervention in the archipelago was the dramatic increase in trade and wealth from China to Southeast Asia. Demand for Chinese tea, for instance, grew from 7.3 million kilograms (16,000,000 pounds) in 1785 to double that amount over the next three decades. The potential profits for the EIC, which held a government-granted monopoly on the tea trade, were huge, and the revenue collected from the tea tax benefited the British government.”

“The final reason for the British return and subsequent dominance of Malaya was the weakening of opposition to their presence in the archipelago. While Britain’s power and prestige had increased in the eighteenth century, the supremacy of the Dutch and the VOC had waned. The Dutch had superior military strength against local powers, such as the Bugis, but not against a country that was as strong and committed to its course as Britain was.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the VOC began to face serious problems. The Netherlands was not a large country, and as it expanded its activities in the archipelago, it became increasingly difficult to find people to maintain its trading empire. Lower-level officials and personnel for the VOC army and navy often were recruited from the criminal elements. The Dutch paid low salaries and as a result, indirectly encouraged their officials to skim money from the company or to go into business for themselves. This corruption and their indolent and self-indulgent lifestyles led to neglect of VOC responsibilities. The weak infrastructure of the company impeded its ability to control the local princes and chieftains and enforce its monopoly on the produce. Debts to the VOC were not paid, and smuggling and attacks on ships became rampant. By the time the French occupied the Netherlands at the end of the eighteenth century, the VOC was a spent force in Southeast Asia.”

“After Britain lost its American colonies in 1783, the EIC began to search for a base in earnest. Once again, Kedah made an offer through Light, this time requesting protection from Siam, which had become powerful in the eighteenth century. The Siamese forced the northern Malay states to pay tribute and declare loyalty to the Siamese throne. If they refused, the Siamese destroyed their towns and villages. Light accepted Sultan Abdullah’s offer of Penang Island, although it is unlikely that either he or the EIC had any real intention of protecting Kedah from its enemies.

At that time many Malay rulers, like Sultan Abdullah, hoped that the British would be their ally against the Siamese in the north and the Dutch in the south. Their experiences with the British country traders had been positive. The traders were fair, gave good advice and along with the Americans, were willing to sell modern weapons to the Malays. But help from the British was not to be – the British were in the archipelago to trade and protect shipping lanes. The only interest they had in involvement with the Malay states was to ensure the safety of that commerce.

In 1786, Light hoisted the Union Jack in a settlement on Penang Island, which he called Georgetown after King George III. Britain had its first foothold in the Straits of Melaka.”

“British order and protection drew merchants and immigrants from all over the archipelago. In what was to be indicative of future British settlements, large numbers of Chinese emigrated to Penang. Within eight years of its establishment, over three thousand Chinese had come to live and work there and constituted the single largest community. The port also drew Arabs, Bugis, Indians, Americans, Persians, Siamese and Malays.

The sultan of Kedah was not particularly happy about the success of Georgetown. He felt the EIC had obtained the port under false pretenses. He received a yearly pension, but it was apparent that the British had no intention of protecting Kedah from the Siamese. In 1791, he assembled a force to attack the British. The British, under Light’s leadership, staged a preemptive strike and destroyed the sultan’s fleet at Prai, directly opposite Penang Island. In order to prevent future incidents and to obtain an area in which to grow food for the island, the British then purchased the district of Prai. They renamed it Province Wellesley. It gave them control of a piece of the mainland facing the island and led to close physical links with Kedah.

Penang never really lived up to Light’s hopes for the colony. Situated at the northern tip of the Straits of Melaka, its strategic value was limited by its distance from the Sunda Straits. Also, it was too far from the sources of much of the strait’s produce. As a naval base its use was limited because it could not provide the kinds of wood necessary for ship repair and experienced difficulty in building dockyards. Whatever significance Penang had was later eclipsed by the success of Singapore.”

“As a result of the French Revolution (1789–99) and its attack on the institution of the monarchy in Europe, Britain joined forces with other European monarchies to try and roll back the republican tide. In 1795, the French created a puppet republic in the Netherlands, and the Dutch king fled to Britain. As the war spread and involved more countries, the British, fearing that the French would use Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia to attack their commerce, convinced Dutch King William to allow British occupation of Dutch overseas territories. And so, in 1795, after token resistance, Melaka changed hands once again and was occupied by EIC forces.

Under the Dutch, Melaka had declined in importance as a trading center, but it had continued to provide the Dutch with a strategic presence in the Straits of Melaka and with a base that forced the Malay states to trade their tin with the VOC. The EIC, knowing that when the war in Europe was over it would have to return Melaka to the Dutch, had plans to make it uninhabitable. Their intention was to move the entire population of 15,000 to Penang and return an empty city to the Dutch, hoping they would then abandon it. To further reduce Melaka’s usefulness to the Dutch, the British demolished its historic Portuguese fort, A Famosa.”

“They believed that the empire should establish institutions that benefited the inhabitants of the lands that it ruled or occupied. Both men took the trouble to learn the language, history and customs of the area. They were the forerunners of the humanitarian concept later known as the “white man’s burden.” Regardless of what one thinks of that attitude, in the case of these two men, they did create the conditions that made it possible for numerous Asian immigrants to prosper and contribute to progress in the cities they established.

Raffles was instrumental in convincing the EIC to change its plans in regard to the future of Melaka. In 1808, while on sick leave from his job in Penang as colonial secretary and Malay interpreter for the government, he visited Melaka. When he recognized the possible repercussions of destroying the city, he argued against it. He felt that it was inhuman to force Eurasians, Chinese, Indians and Malays, who had lived in Melaka for hundreds of years, to move to another place. Most would resist, and it would be absurd to force them to do so at gunpoint. Second, Melaka was not a commercial threat to Penang, but if it was abandoned, any state could take it over and threaten British strategic interests. Hinted at here was perhaps Raffles’ belief that keeping Melaka was a first step in pushing British interests farther south and incorporating all the Dutch possessions into the British Empire. Third, Melaka’s population of 15,000 had a sufficient tax base to pay its administrative and defense costs, so it would not be a financial drain on the EIC. Finally, he argued that Britain could not destroy a city after it had promised to protect it because Britain and the EIC would lose credibility in the area.

Raffles prevailed, and the EIC did not destroy Melaka. The settlement remained under the British until 1957, except for brief periods of occupation by the Dutch (1818–1824) and the Japanese (1942–1945). Raffles also managed to save the gate of A Famosa, which today is one of the oldest man-made structures in Malaysia. Had the EIC gone ahead with its plans, the historical city of Melaka would probably not exist today.”

Singapore’s Origins

“Because of its agreement with the Netherlands, Britain had occupied all the Dutch possessions except for Java, which resisted the takeover. Lord Minto, who was organizing a force to invade Java, wanted Raffles as an aide because of his extensive knowledge of the area. The British assembled an invasion army in Melaka and successfully occupied Java in 1811.

Raffles was made the head of the EIC administration in Java. He spent five years in Java, tackling the excesses of Dutch rule by ending the slave trade, limiting the importation of opium and establishing a land tenure system. While in Java, Raffles wrote A History of Java, a classic piece of scholarship. For this and for his efforts on behalf of the empire, he was knighted in 1817.

Throughout this time, Raffles continued to advocate that Britain should retain all Dutch possessions in the archipelago after the war in Europe was over. The archipelago might be a far different place today if his efforts had been successful and Java had become part of the British Empire. But the future of British policy in the Malay world was to be determined by European considerations rather than by the opinions of men such as Raffles who were already present in Southeast Asia. When the Napoleonic Wars ended, the British government intended to have strong counterbalances in Europe to prevent future French aggression. A powerful Netherlands was an important ingredient in this plan, and the British felt that the Dutch could only be strong if they possessed an overseas empire. The British had already decided to keep the Dutch colonies they had seized on the cape of Africa and in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Thus, if the Dutch were going to have an empire, their possessions in the archipelago would have to be returned.

In 1818, the Dutch territories were returned, and Raffles became governor of the British colony of Bencoolen. Situated on the western coast of Sumatra, it was a relatively insignificant assignment, but he had his foot in the door. It was from this base that Raffles would establish modern Singapore, but that in itself was not his greatest impact on the history of Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore was a means to an end, that end being British control of the straits and the trade that flowed through it. Ultimately, Raffles’ move on Singapore led to British domination of the entire Malay Peninsula.

Raffles feared that, with the Dutch return to Batavia, Riau, Melaka and ports on the eastern coast of Sumatra, it would only be a matter of time before they dominated the entire archipelago, especially given the vigor with which they were reestablishing their presence in the area. The Dutch appeared to be intent on restoring their monopoly on trade and had banned British ships from all their ports, except Batavia.

Raffles felt that Britain had to obtain a trading and naval base south of Penang to thwart Dutch intentions. The problem was that the British government did not want to upset the Dutch, and the EIC, Raffles’ employer, did not want to take on costly military or administrative ventures. Raffles believed that the consequences of British inaction would be Dutch primacy in the archipelago. He finally convinced Lord Hastings, governor general of India, to allow him to search for a British base near Riau. The permission was conditional on avoiding conflict with the Dutch. This was a tall order, which he proceeded to ignore because virtually any site he chose would bring him into conflict with the Dutch.

Raffles sailed from India in December 1818, and there is little doubt that Singapore was the site he had in mind for a British port and base. It was an ideal site – it had an excellent natural harbor, ample timber supplies and fresh drinking water. Moreover, it sat astride some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

When he arrived in January 1819, the island had a reputation for piracy. Singapore had been a thriving trading center in the fourteenth century and a small entrepôt at the height of the Johor Empire in the seventeenth century. However, in 1819, only a small settlement was ruled by the temenggung of Johor, who apparently had hereditary rights to the island. Traditionally, the temenggung had been an important official in the royal Malay courts, but with the demise of the Johor Empire, the position was more that of village chieftain. On the island were Chinese who had spice plantations around the area where downtown Singapore is today, and groups of Orang Laut (sea gypsies) were concentrated around the mouths of the Singapore, Kallang and Seletar Rivers. Together, these people constituted a population of about a thousand.”

“Dutch attempts to dislodge the British moved to Europe and to the diplomats. In this arena, the Dutch had considerable support. Many members of the British government saw Raffles’ actions as a violation of government policy. Within the EIC, there was significant opposition – from Penang, whose officials felt that Singapore was a threat to their future, and from India, which thought it was a costly venture that would drag the company into a profit-draining conflict with the Dutch. If there had been modern communication at the time, Singapore probably would have been returned to the Dutch.

What saved Singapore was its success. While diplomats, bureaucrats and company officials argued, Singapore’s destiny was already established. The offer of free trade and the opportunity to avoid the Dutch monopoly had an effect on immigration and commerce much like it had on Penang but on a much more impressive scale. By 1821, Singapore’s population had increased to 5,000, and by 1824, it was over ten thousand. Like Penang, it drew people from all over the world, especially the Chinese, who from the very start made up the majority of the population. In its first year of existence, British Singapore conducted over $400,000 in trade. In 1821, this increased to $8 million and in 1823 to $13 million. By 1825, the trade figures for the British ports were Melaka $2.5 million, Penang $8.5 million and Singapore about $22 million.

Singapore had become too important a port for Britain to return it to the Dutch. By 1821, the EIC had changed its tune and favored keeping Singapore. The following year, the British government made it clear to the Dutch that they were there to stay, and it was time to renegotiate the future of the Dutch and the British in the archipelago.”

“It is impossible for any visitor to Singapore today to avoid the apparent importance of Sir Stamford Raffles to the history of the island. To twist a phrase by Winston Churchill, never in the course of human events has so much been named after a man who spent so little time in a place.”

“Singapore was once famous for its pervasive campaigns to improve civil life, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Some examples include a courtesy campaign, an anti-smoking campaign and a save water campaign. Munshi Abdullah describes two of Singapore’s nineteenth century campaigns:

There were thousands of rats all over the district, some almost as large as cats. They were so big that they used to attack us if we went out walking at night and many people were knocked over. Colonel Farquhar made an order saying “To anyone who kills a rat I will give one wang [coin].” When people heard of this they devised all manner of instruments for killing rats. At first the rats brought in every morning were counted almost in thousands, and Colonel Farquhar paid out according to his promise. After six or seven days a multitude of rats were still to be seen and he promised five duit [smaller coin], for each rat caught. They were still brought in thousands and Colonel Farquhar ordered a very deep trench to be dug and the dead bodies to be buried. Finally the uproar and the campaign against the rats in Singapore came to an end, the infestation having completely subsided.

Some time later a great many centipedes appeared, people being bitten by them all over the place. In every dwelling, if one sat for any length of time, two or three centipedes would drop from the atap roof. When the news reached Colonel Farquhar he made an order saying that to anyone who killed a centipede he would give one wang. Hearing this people searched high and low for centipedes, and every day they brought in hundreds, which they had caught by methods of their own devising. So the numbers dwindled until once in two or three days some twenty or thirty centipedes were brought in. Finally the campaign and furor caused by the centipedes came to an end, and people no longer cried out because of the pain when they got bitten.”

“In 1824, Britain and the Netherlands came to an agreement on the future of their interests in the archipelago: in what was called the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. They agreed that Singapore would be recognized as British and Riau as Dutch. They drew a line down the middle of the Straits of Melaka, agreeing that all territories north and east of the line would fall under British influence and all lands south under the Dutch. Britain was recognized as the sole power in the peninsula but gave up all claims to Sumatra and thus transferred Bencoolen to the Dutch.

The results of this treaty had far-reaching implications for the people in the archipelago. The destinies of the people in the Malay Mediterranean became separate. For example, Riau, which had been part of Johor, Melaka and Srivijaya, was cut off from the peninsula. The treaty led to the creation of Indonesia and Malaysia, two separate nations formed from one cultural entity, devised in Europe without regard for the traditional flow of people and cultures. Further, the treaty established Britain as the unrivaled trading power in Asia. Between its navy and the occupation of Penang, Melaka and Singapore, Britain controlled the shipping lanes between India and China, as well as being the entrepôt for produce from the archipelago.

The British and the Chinese, who flocked to these colonies, had taken over the trade in which the Malays had previously been an important part. Increasingly, the vast majority of the Malays were pushed into a rural, agricultural life and cut off from the centers of commerce they had dominated for so long. As the nineteenth century progressed, the Malays confronted a world over which they had little control.”

“After the opening of the canal, the average was forty-five days, instead of 117. The ship in which a person invested could make three trips a year as opposed to one for a ship sailing around Africa. This speed, coupled with the increased capacity of steamships, lowered the cost of freight significantly. It has been estimated that the cost per ton of freight between Singapore and London in the 1860s was about $100 per ton, but by 1887 had dropped to about $8 per ton. This drop in freight costs not only meant increased profits for the merchant but provided less expensive goods for the consumer. Goods previously considered luxury goods became affordable on both continents.

In Singapore, the volume of trade grew exponentially. In 1860, the tonnage of ships using the port was 500,000 tons; by 1878, this had tripled to 1.6 million tons. Steamships needed fuel, and Singapore was ready to provide that service, first as a coaling station and later on as an oil bunkerage, a role it continues to play today.

Singapore’s trade with the United States also boomed. One reason was the general growth in the American economy, but more specifically, a second factor was the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1870, which opened American markets to straits produce. The United States had been buying tin, rattan, coffee and spices for some time, but shipping the produce to the large markets in the eastern and mid-western United States was expensive. The steamship and the railroad changed that.”

“A form of indentured labor developed and was known as the credit ticket system. Laborers would board a ship in one of the southern ports and when they arrived in Singapore or Penang, Chinese merchants would buy them from the ship’s captain. The migrants were then obligated to work for the merchants until they paid off those costs. The Chinese hoped that they could then find work, send money home and eventually save enough to return home. Most sent money home, but few returned to China wealthy. For some of those who migrated to Singapore, the journey did not end there. Because of a lack of government supervision and regulation in Singapore, many migrants were practically sold into slavery as coolies in other parts of the world. Singapore was no workers’ paradise, but the conditions for coolies in Sumatra and Cuba, for instance, were far worse. Newspapers in London criticized the abuses of the coolie trade, but the lack of regulation was symptomatic of the laissez-faire attitude of the EIC government and its inability to either communicate with or control the social problems of its Asian population.

In the nineteenth century, two Chinese societies developed in Singapore, one made up of immigrant Chinese and one of migrant workers.”

“In the middle of the nineteenth century, Singapore was a city of predominantly single men who did not have the responsibilities or the moral constraints that families place on men. It was a port city with all the problems that come with sailors who have been out at sea for long periods of time. Only a small minority looked on Singapore as home and felt any civic responsibility toward it. Its ineffective government was out of touch with its inhabitants. Prostitution and gambling boomed, as did all the abuses that went along with a relatively lawless town. For men who did mind-numbing physical labor, opium smoking became a popular diversion. It was estimated by a newspaper of that time that 20 percent of the total population and half of the adult Chinese were opium addicts.

The government and the EIC were active participants in gambling and opium activities. British administrators, desperate to find sources of revenue due to the EIC’s neglect of their needs, sold gambling franchises, and the revenue from opium sales became their largest single source of income.”

Toward the 19th Century

“The Americans ignored this edict, even though the sultan’s fees were about half those charged by the Dutch or British. Their attitude was that it was not necessary to pay a “half-savage potentate.” This arrogance led to the first known American military action against an Asian state. In February 1834, the American pepper trader, the Friendship, was boarded at the port of Kuala Batu. Two crewmen were killed and silver and opium valued at $20,000 was stolen. The captain escaped and eventually recaptured his ship and returned home. President Andrew Jackson sent the USS Potomac to Aceh to deal with this outrage. The captain’s orders were to obtain compensation from the sultan, and if he was unsuccessful in the capital, to demand it from the town of Kuala Batu. Instead, the Potomac sailed directly to Kuala Batu and demanded the thieves be handed over. The local chieftain claimed they were gone. The Potomac then proceeded to bombard the town, killing some 250 people. Suspecting that the villains had fled to the town of Muchi, the Potomac bombarded it as well. Only then did the ship sail to the capital and demand compensation from the sultan.

The sultan refused. His position was that the Americans had refused to pay his trading fees and recognize his sovereignty before the incident and that he was not responsible or liable for the consequences.”

“As long as Singapore was run by the EIC, there was little hope for change. For social conditions to improve, Singapore had to be run by administrators whose main interests were in local affairs. Movement in this direction began after the Indian Mutiny in India (1857–1858), when the EIC was abolished. Singapore was no longer under company rule but under British Indian rule, and Singapore’s merchant community lobbied in London for the Straits Settlements to be a separate colony. In 1867, the British government established the crown colony with its own government and administration based in Singapore.

Becoming a separate colony meant the creation of a Straits Settlements civil service, which could be trained to deal with conditions in the territories. Its members could be required to learn Chinese and Malay in order to extend government influence in the Asian communities. Another change was the establishment of a Singapore legislative council as a law-making body. Although this council was not democratically elected, those appointed to it could raise issues and propose legislation reflecting the concerns of Singapore’s population. By the twentieth century, half the members were colonial administrators and the other half consisted of members of the British business community and Asians who represented the Straits Chinese and commercial interests. The governor still held veto power over the council and echoed the aims of the British government, but the council represented an important step forward in Singapore’s political development.”

“A Malay community was also evolving in this bustling entrepôt. The city was predominantly Chinese, but its unique Malay community reflected the cosmopolitan nature of Singapore. By the turn of the twentieth century, there were some 35,000 people living in Singapore who were classified as Malays, but within that group, there were ten subgroups, including the Bugis, Acehnese, Min-angkabau, Javanese, Boyanese, Bidayuh, peninsular Malays, Madurese, Orang Laut and Arabs. Singapore was the Malay melting pot of the archipelago.

People from all over the archipelago settled in peninsular Malaya, but this process was different from the development of the Malay community in Singapore. The movement of the Bugis to Selangor and Johor; the Minangkabau to Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Melaka and Johor; and the Acehnese to Perak took place over time and in a rural context. Each group intermarried with the local inhabitants and developed ties as a part of the community or village in which they settled. The end results were societies in which cultures and ways of life were adapted and assimilated, usually in one-on-one situations.

The kampungs of Singapore were part of an urban society and contained diverse groups of people from all over the peninsula and archipelago. While the kampungs in Malaya were bound together by deep ties of family and community, in Singapore, Malays were close because of their language and religion in the face of the more alien Chinese and Indians. The kampungs in Malaya revolved around the needs of an agricultural society. In Singapore, the people were merchants and wage earners outside the community and faced a barrage of cultural influences unknown in the rural villages of their homelands.

Given what bound these Malays together in Singapore, it is not surprising that the city was a significant center of scholarship for the Malay language and Islam. In Singapore, the Malay language was confronted for the first time with the world of Western commerce and industry, and the world of Western government and law. Much new vocabulary entered the Malay language through Malay newspapers and journals. The process was not unlike what had taken place as a result of Indianization. The Malay world at that time had felt the impact on its language, but it took the cosmopolitan worlds of Srivijaya and Melaka to solidify common usage in the wider Malay world. Singapore, because of its position in the crossroads of the archipelago and the presence of its diverse community of Malays, played a similar role in adapting the Malay language to the European world.”

The 20th Century

“As Singapore entered the twentieth century, it could be best described as a transient society. Few British actually settled in Singapore. Thus those who ran the government and much of the trade were only temporary residents. Within the Asian community, the majority also viewed their residence as temporary. As a result, it was a society that only around a quarter of the population saw as home.”

“Equally important was tin’s effect on the Malay political system. All of a sudden, Malay leaders in the interior had huge sources of income, and many became wealthier than the sultans and high-level officials in the coastal royal capitals, who had lost their trading resources. The underpinnings of the feudal Malay political system were threatened as these new leaders with revenue and purely local interests challenged the traditional power structure. In the absence of other factors, these changes might have been part of a healthy evolution from feudalism to a modern state. The problem was that at the very time that they were taking place, the Malay states were faced with the influx of huge numbers of Chinese migrants who came to work in the tin mines. The sultanates were in no position to cope with the instability and disorder caused by this population change.

Malaya had been home to immigrants for centuries. For example, the Bugis and the Minangkabaus represented waves of immigrants who came to the peninsula and settled, eventually becoming part of the population. These immigrants had come from elsewhere in the archipelago, and while they were different from peninsular Malays, they shared a common religion, similar languages and the cultural traditions of the archipelago. Their migration was similar to the succeeding waves of European immigrants to the United States. Each new group, be it Irish, Italian or Polish, had enough in common with those already in the United States that by the second or third generation, they had assimilated to a large degree.”

“The Chinese migration in the nineteenth century was a totally new phenomenon because the Chinese did not integrate into the local population. The resident Chinese had been in Malaya since the time of Melaka, but they had come in small numbers and had basically adapted. This time they came in large numbers. In Perak, Negri Sembilan and Selangor, they eventually outnumbered the Malays. Through their kongsi, secret societies and dialect groups, they were self-sufficient and had little interest in interacting with the Malays, except when feuds broke out between Malay chiefs, and the Chinese were forced to take sides.”

“In the short run, the problems the migrants caused were similar to those of the Straits Settlements in the early years. The difference was that in the Malay states, especially Selangor and Perak, the conflicts occurred in areas where the political systems had become ineffective. The repercussions of their rivalries on Malay society eventually helped force the British to reevaluate their policy of non-intervention and take control of the peninsula.”

“The desire to maintain stable, free-flowing trade out of Singapore and Penang had to be a primary consideration for policy makers both in London and on the ground in the straits. This had been evident in Britain’s first intervention in its suppression of “piracy” and was the underlying motivation in the instructions to the new governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke. He was authorized to embark on limited interference in the affairs of the Malay states. His official orders called for the “preservation of peace and security, the suppression of piracy and the development of roads, schools and police, through the appointment of a political agent or resident in each state.”

Clarke acted swiftly to solve the problems in Selangor and Perak. Within two months of his arrival in Singapore, he summoned a meeting of the warring factions to end the Perak Civil War. The meeting took place aboard a British ship off Pangkor Island in January 1874. Raja Abdullah, Ngah Ibrahim, the chiefs of lower Perak and the leaders of the two Chinese secret societies were in attendance.

This meeting produced two results. One was that the Ghee Hin and Hai San agreed to cease fighting, disarm and accept a British government commission to enforce the peace. By far the most significant agreement to come out of this meeting was the Treaty of Pangkor. This treaty signified the beginning of the creation of British Malaya. Under this treaty, Raja Abdullah was recognized as the rightful sultan, and he agreed to accept a British resident “whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom.” The resident was to take charge of the collection and control of all revenue, and the chiefs were to be given allowances. Ngah Ibrahim accepted an assistant resident in Larut with the same authority as that of a resident. This was the start of “indirect rule,” whereby the British began to modernize and develop the Malay states.”

“The residential system had little impact on the everyday lives of a significant majority of the Malays. Their village leadership remained intact; the sultan was a distant figure and venerated as God’s representative. The farmer and the fisherman had little contact with central authority prior to the intervention by the British, and the same was true afterward. Most Malays never laid eyes on an Englishmen in their entire lives. The establishment of law and order, an end to debt slavery, improvements in public health and more secure titles to their land had positive effects on village people but did not significantly alter their traditional way of life, except for those close to urban areas, who were drawn into the market economy.”

“As time went on, it became apparent that separately governed states retarded growth on the peninsula. One of the problems was the growing power and independence of the individual residents. In theory, each resident was answerable to the governor of the Straits Settlements, but in practice, they went their own ways. Communication with Singapore was poor, and the governor’s primary concern was the administration of Penang, Melaka and Singapore. Thus the residents operated with little supervision. Differing codes of law and administration began to evolve in the four states. Infrastructure, such as roads, railroads and communication, could only be developed efficiently through intrastate cooperation. There was a need for some kind of central coordination and control to ensure that the development of the four states as a group took precedence over what a particular resident saw as the needs of his state.

Another problem was unequal rates of development. Perak, Selangor and to a lesser extent, Negri Sembilan were progressing at much faster rates than Pahang. The Pahang War had drained the state treasury, forcing it to assume a large debt. The resources of the state were more difficult to develop because of the inaccessibility of areas in the interior and the lack of revenue to build the roads to get to them. The northeast monsoon and the central mountain range also isolated Pahang and thereby retarded its growth. On the other hand, Perak and Selangor were doing quite well as a result of the revenue they received from their huge tin deposits. An example of the discrepancies was that in 1895, Perak had fifteen hospitals, Selangor fourteen and Pahang only two.

These problems led to the call for some kind of centralized governmental control, which would create greater uniformity of law, rein in the power of the individual residents and allow the use of the revenue of the more developed areas to help those that were lagging behind. Some, such as William Maxwell, the colonial secretary in Singapore, wanted to merge the protected Malay states with the Straits Settlements, while others, such as Frank Swettenham, then resident of Perak, thought centralization should be limited to the four states.”

“What finally emerged was close to Swettenham: model and became known as the Federated Malay States (FMS). The plan called for the establishment of a federal capital at Kuala Lumpur and the creation of a new position of resident general, who would supervise the residents and coordinate policy for the four states.”

“The choice of Kuala Lumpur (literally “muddy estuary”) as the capital of the new federation was indicative of the changes that took place in Malaya. Originally, it was a town similar to many western towns in the United States, which popped up as boomtowns with the discovery of gold and silver. Its growth was a result of the “tin rush” of the 1860s and 1870s and the determination and force of personality of a Hakka immigrant, Yap Ah Loy. In many ways, Yap was representative of a group of Chinese immigrants who came to Malaysia and made significant fortunes. He came to the area at the age of seventeen to work as a coolie in the tin mines. He joined the Hai San secret society and became one of the gang’s enforcers. Yap tried his hand at being a cook and a small businessman before he moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1862, where he made a fortune in property and tin mines. By 1868, he was recognized as Capitan China, the leader of the Chinese community. It is estimated that by 1880 he owned half the town.

When the Selangor Civil War and a concurrent drop in tin prices devastated the town, Yap virtually revived it, spending his entire fortune and going deeply into debt. His gamble almost failed when the entire town burned down in 1881, but Yap built it again. His efforts were rewarded when Kuala Lumpur became the state capital in 1880 and later the capital of the FMS. Since he owned a significant part of the city, Yap quickly rebuilt his fortune.”

The Early 20th Century

“As the nineteenth century drew to a close, administrators in the FMS and the Straits Settlements were increasingly eager for control of the entire peninsula and intervention in the Malay states still under the influence of Siam – Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Patani and Terengganu.

During the nineteenth century, the British government had rejected the pleas for intervention from these states because of its policies toward Siam. The latter played an important role as a buffer zone between the French in Indochina and British interests in the peninsula. A strong, friendly Siam was more important to the British than the potential benefits of controlling the northern Malay states. British trade and relations with Siam had improved tremendously in the second half of the century, and London did not want to rock the boat by threatening Siam’s interests on the peninsula. In the early twentieth century, this policy toward northern Malaya changed.

For the last three or four decades of the nineteenth century, the four northern states enjoyed a period of relative peace, stability and independence. Part of the reason for this was the active presence of the British. The intervention of the British in the southern states meant that the civil conflicts and intrigues no longer spilled over the borders into the northern states. Disputes within the northern states were also relatively short-lived because of the absence of allies in the peninsula, which had prolonged and escalated their internal problems in the past. Apart from this, their lack of significant natural resources made it possible to avoid the destabilizing influence of large numbers of Chinese laborers. While nominally under control of Siam, they enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy because of a Siamese fear that efforts to directly control the northern states would give the British an excuse for intervention, as had happened in Terengganu in the early 1860s.

Given the growing British economic and political interests in the peninsula, it was inevitable that relations with Siam and the northern states would change. One factor that contributed to this change was the rise of Germany as a world power. Germany’s massive military buildup, coupled with its desire to establish an empire to service its growing economy, drove the French and British into a common cause to counter the German threat. In 1896, the British and French committed to maintaining an independent Siamese state, and in 1904, they agreed to respect each other’s territories and spheres of influence – French in Indochina and British in the peninsula. These Anglo-French agreements eliminated Britain’s need for Siam as a barrier to the French and thus lessened the need to please Siam by not interfering in the northern states. They, however, did not eliminate Britain’s fear of German meddling.

In 1899, the Germans tried to convince the Siamese government to cede them the island of Langkawi off the coast of Kedah. While the Siamese eventually turned them down, these negotiations made the British nervous.”

“The Treaty of Bangkok had an impact on the Malay world similar to that of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. It arbitrarily divided the Malay community. Diplomats in Bangkok decided that the Malay state of Patani was to be permanently incorporated into the kingdom of Siam. The state had always been under considerable control from Siam because of its abundant natural resources and strategic importance, but its people spoke Malay and were Muslim. To this very day, this area of Thailand chafes at Thai control.

The intention of the British was to set up relationships with the northern states similar to the ones they had with Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang and to later bring them into an expanded FMS. The problem was that no one had asked the rulers of these states if that was what they wanted. The treaty had been negotiated without consulting the sultans and presented to them after the fact. Sultan Abdul Hamid of Kedah purportedly said at the time that they had been “bought and sold like a buffalo.”

Kelantan, which had the most severe financial problems and was the most underdeveloped of the four states, readily accepted a British resident and the model of indirect rule, but the other states balked at the idea.”

“Eventually, they were coerced into accepting British advisors, although these advisors did not have as much power as the residents in the FMS. Beyond accepting the advisors, they refused to budge and along with Johor, became collectively known as the unfederated Malay states. All four states had much greater Malay participation in the running of their state governments, and the ruling families enjoyed much greater independence from the “advice” of the British than those in the FMS.”

“Until the Japanese invasion of 1941, Malaya was under three forms of government. There were the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Melaka and Penang. The FMS of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were in theory ruled indirectly but, for all practical purposes, were ruled by a central government at Kuala Lumpur. The unfederated Malay states of Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu followed the original indirect rule model that had Malay rulers and British advisors.”

Borneo

“In the sixteenth century, Brunei was a relatively peaceful place to trade compared to the Straits of Melaka. It was an important distribution center for Indian textiles in the South China Sea and eastern archipelago, a source of jungle produce, such as rattan and bird’s nest for China, and an entrepôt for nutmeg, cloves and pepper from neighboring islands. Unlike other Muslim states, the sultanate was willing to trade with the Portuguese, as well as other European powers. As a result, it became a regular port of call in the trade between Melaka and Macao. Brunei’s influence and control stretched into significant portions of what is now the Philippines, and it was a thriving, wealthy city of some twenty to forty thousand people.

Yet in some ways, the Brunei sultanate was quite similar to the Malay entrepôt states of Melaka and Johor. The sultanate’s power came from control of the river mouths along the coast and the allegiance of the leaders of those settlements. The royal family’s wealth and prestige resulted from the trade that passed through its port, and its government was modeled after its Malay predecessors. In the sixteenth century, the sultanate prospered and was able to avoid the dislocations that took place in the peninsula after the arrival of the Europeans. Brunei was far away from the fiercely contested straits and was useful enough to all that it was left alone.

While its beginnings were similar to those of Melaka and Johor, the area originally controlled and influenced by Brunei evolved in a different manner. In the peninsula, there was a continual influx of Malay immigrants. New areas were settled, and the indigenous people were pushed farther into the interior. Malay agricultural communities developed away from the courts, and these gradually formed the shapes of the Malay states.”

“Most of the tribes of Borneo share a common style of architecture known as the longhouse, which is literally an entire village in one building. Like many semi-nomadic people of the area, they practice slash-and-burn agriculture, in which food production is a communal endeavor. In the past, the primary purpose of living together under one roof was for security in a hostile environment. For all practical purposes, the longhouse is a fortress. Most are built close to Borneo’s highways, the rivers. Raised some 3.6 meters (12 feet) off the ground, they were too high for the spears and poison-tipped darts of their enemies.

The longhouse is the home of the entire community, and the larger the number of inhabitants, the greater the security. Some are as long as 365 meters (1,200 feet) and contain as many as one hundred families. Against one wall are rooms for each family. The length of the other long wall is a common area, a combination village lane and community center. Unmarried males live in the common area, while unmarried females live in a loft. A common practice among some tribes allows unmarried people to cohabit with multiple partners until they find a compatible mate.”

“Brooke was a skilled negotiator, and he was able to convince the various parties that Sarawak under his leadership could offer a better future for all involved. Some had second thoughts, but initially he charmed and cajoled them into accepting peace. The coastal Malays were willing to accept outside intervention as were the Bidayuhs. The second largest of the indigenous groups, they were constantly attacked by the numerically larger and more warlike Ibans. Perhaps a foreigner who was neutral could bring an end to this and to the poor treatment they received from the coastal Malays.

The peace placed Hassim in a quandary. Brooke had fulfilled his half of the bargain, but Hassim did not have the authority to give away part of the sultan’s land. His hand was forced when Makota botched an attempt to poison Brooke’s interpreter, and Brooke threatened to lead another revolt. Hassim proclaimed Brooke raja of Sarawak in November 1841. Thus began the succession of the three Caucasian kings of Sarawak, which ended when Vyner Brooke, James’ great nephew, ceded Sarawak to the British in 1946.”

“A tool used by Brooke in his attempts to find a balance between development and preservation was the organization of the government and economy along racial lines. Chinese immigrants were invited into the state to provide the impetus for economic growth. Most of them settled in the towns along the coast and rivers, and they provided the retail trade, developed most of the export crops and manned the mines. There was some indigenous participation in the economy as well. The Ibans and Bidayuhs provided jungle produce for the world market, and the Melanaus grew sago, but the Chinese were key middlemen in the marketing of these products. By having the Chinese develop the economy, it was hoped that the indigenous people would be insulated from the negative effects of a modern capitalist economy. At the same time, the industrious Chinese would provide the revenue to run the government.

The Malays were drawn into the state administrative service. In their roles as civil servants and policemen, they maintained some of their status as the former rulers of the state. This is not to say that was all the Malays did, as many found work in agricultural pursuits. They were, however, the primary local group that was invited into the day-to-day running of the government. By the last third of the nineteenth century, the sultan of Brunei, desperate for revenue and with little real influence outside his capital city, was willing to give his approval to almost any scheme that would produce income for his court. To the south, he had allowed James Brooke to incorporate large sections of Brunei into Sarawak in return for increased yearly payments.

North of the capital, a similar process took place in the area now known as the Malaysian state of Sabah. The northern end of Borneo east of Marudu Bay was considered part of Brunei until the latter part of the eighteenth century when the sultan of Brunei ceded his rights to the sultan of Sulu. However, the reigning sultan refused to recognize Sulu’s claims, and in 1865 ceded it to the American consul in Brunei, Charles Lee Moses.

An unlikely diplomat, Moses had served as an enlisted man in the American Navy during the Civil War and had been forced to leave the service. His financial resources were meager to the point that he had to borrow money in Singapore to pay his passage to Brunei. An adventurer more than a diplomat, Moses probably had dreams of creating an American version of Sir James Brooke’s settlement in Sarawak. Moses’ official position was a key factor in the sultan’s decision because the sultan hoped that an American presence would act as a counterweight to growing British interference in his affairs.”

“Moses had no hope of finding the money for his venture, and he sold his rights to another American, Joseph Torey. Torey established the American Trading Company of Borneo, and by December 1865, some 12 Americans and 50 Chinese were present in a settlement named Ellena. The sultan of Brunei proclaimed Torey the rajah of Ambong and Maruda.

If Torrey had been a better businessman, the history of Sabah might have been radically different. He was not able to raise sufficient capital for the venture; one of his partners, Thomas B. Harris, died in Ellena; and by late 1866, the colony had failed. Torey sold his interests to the Austrian consul-general in Hong Kong. Ironically, Moses never saw a penny from his sale to Torey, and the sultan was never paid by anyone. Desperate for money, Moses burned down his consulate in Brunei and demanded compensation from the sultan. The sultan refused. An American naval ship eventually removed Moses from the sultanate, and somewhere in the Pacific in 1867, he fell overboard and drowned.”

Malaysian Chinese & Indians

“The availability of inexpensive labor was important in the economic development of the areas under British influence. The most logical source of labor would have been the indigenous Malay population. For a variety of reasons, however, they played a minor role in providing the labor to develop the rapidly growing economy. Instead, the British actively encouraged the importation of labor from China and the Indian subcontinent.”

“Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of World War II, the Chinese population tripled from some eight hundred thousand in 1900, when they made up less than a third of the population, to over 2.5 million in 1941, when they constituted close to half of Malaya’s population. The Malays were a minority in their own land, accounting for about 41 percent of the population.”

“As a group, the Indian community that settled in Malaya did not prosper as much as the Chinese. By the 1950s, the per capita income of the Indians was a third less than that of the Chinese. To this day, large numbers of Indians are still over-represented in low paid occupations in manual and menial labor. The “immigrant mentality” should have driven them as it did their Chinese counterparts, but a majority of the Indians did not have an immigrant experience in its classic sense. Their opportunities for social and economic mobility were hindered by the plantation system. Since they were British subjects with close ties to British India, the Malayan government took a deeper interest in the terms and conditions of their employment. They were given housing on the plantations with education for their children and access to health care, as well as food and clothing. They lived in secure and isolated societies that were vastly different from the dynamic sink-or-swim experiences of other immigrants.

This is not to say that the Indians lived in some kind of paternalistic workers’ paradise. Conditions on the plantations varied from place to place. Generally, pay was low and the amenities basic. Because of the need to maintain a pool of inexpensive rubber tappers, educational opportunities were deliberately kept at a minimum. Education on the plantations was conducted in Tamil and stopped after the primary level. Over half the Indian community had little opportunity or ability to participate in the economic boom other than as laborers. This contrasted with the lifestyle of the Indian community in Singapore and with Indians who migrated to cities in Malaya, where they had access to English-language schools and lived the immigrant experience and subsequently benefited from it.”

“They, however, still failed to realize the need for schools to promote a Malayan outlook, that is, to foster among Chinese youth a feeling that Malaya was their home. The continuation of the curriculum in the Chinese language reinforced the separateness of the races and reflected the roles the government foresaw for the different races.

To many British policy makers, the Malays were to remain fishermen and farmers; the Chinese were to work for other Chinese as laborers or retail traders; and the Indians were to remain clerks, plantation workers and laborers.

The three races did intermingle in many of the English-language schools. The British view that the races should be educated in their individual native tongues was qualified by the government’s need for English-educated Malayans. The government already offered these opportunities to Malays, but as the economy grew, it began to offer them to all English-educated people. The language of commerce was English. As the population expanded and the country modernized, opportunities in the professions widened. The country needed doctors, lawyers, engineers and architects, and it was impossible and impractical for them all to be British. The road to participation in any of these areas was through the English-language schools.”

“As the area grew and prospered, the Malays benefited very little from that progress. In 1957, when Malaya gained independence from Britain, the average annual income of the respective races in the country was Chinese $3,223, Indians $2,013 and Malays $1,463. These numbers include the value of what the Malays grew and consumed themselves. In 1970, after thirteen years of concerted effort by the government to raise the economic level of the Malays, the annual income of Chinese households was $4,644, Indians $3,720 and Malays $2,148. The Malays were outstripped economically in their own country by the immigrant races. In the words of historian Lennox Mills, “when the British came, the Malay was a poor man in a poor country; when they left he was a poor man in a rich country.”

“In the first two decades of the twentieth century, British and Malay leaders became concerned that the booming economy would strip the Malays of the one asset they had — land. The fear was that the booming land prices would encourage the Malays to sell their land to foreign and immigrant interests. To stop this from happening, laws creating Malay reserve land were passed.

Beginning with the Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 and strengthened by subsequent revisions, significant portions of each state were set aside for ownership only by the Malays. The laws went a step further than to simply protect Malay land ownership. They also stipulated what the land could be used for — agriculture. As the Malays began to plant rubber and other commercial crops, the authorities, fearing a drop in food production, made it illegal to use rice land for other agricultural purposes.

Although many found ways to skirt these laws, the message was that the Malays were not only to remain rural but also to produce traditional crops. The irony is that although the British wanted the Malays to produce the nation’s staple food supply, the lack of serious commitment to increasing their productivity meant that in the decades prior to World War I, Malaya imported about half its supply of food. There were other ramifications of this land policy. One was that the land, and therefore the country, belonged to the Malays, and second that the immigrant races were effectively barred from agriculture, thus reinforcing the urban/rural population patterns of the races. By 1921, only about 6 percent of the Malay population lived in towns with populations of over a thousand people.”

“The railroads and roads were built with the needs of the export sectors in mind. For the most part, they were along the western coast, connecting the mines and plantations to the new cities, such as Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur, and to the ports of Penang and Singapore. Little attention was paid to the food producing areas or the eastern coast. The only predominantly Malay state that had a somewhat higher standard of living was Kedah, and that was mainly because of its proximity and access to Penang.

The Malays’ ability to raise their income levels was also constrained by their lack of understanding of markets and a monetary economy. The complexities of market prices, transportation costs, distribution systems and interest rates were lost on the Malays. To them, money itself was a relatively new and rare commodity. Their lack of knowledge and access to markets left them in the hands of middlemen, mostly Chinese, who provided the links between the Malays and the consumers of their produce.”

“Once the Chinese gained control of a particular service, skill or market, they were not about to give it up easily. They were determined to survive in their new country. Historian Richard Winstedt cites numerous examples of this determination. For example, a Malay once tried to deal in rice in a state that was predominantly Malay, but the only motor transport system was owned by a Chinese firm, which gave the Chinese rice dealers cheap rates until the Malay interloper was driven out.”

Mid-Century Singapore

“The Exclusion Act was reinforced by an 1884 treaty with China to curtail immigration, and both actions caused deep, worldwide Chinese resentment of Americans. In 1904, the resentment had built to the point where China was forced to withdraw from the treaty but the exclusion laws were still in effect, and in the same year, beginning in Shanghai, Chinese business leaders began to call for boycotts of American goods to protest its immigration policies.

In June 1905, Chinese merchants in Singapore picked up the call for an American boycott. Most of them had roots in the same part of China as those who had gone to America, and this created a degree of solidarity. Singapore Chinese were also insulted by the inherent racism of the Exclusion Act, and many feared that the British might institute a similar law in Singapore.

The boycott was significant because it crossed the fault lines of the Chinese community and appeared to achieve a degree of success. In a request for intervention to the British Foreign Office, the American Embassy in London claimed that “the trade in general is at a standstill.” It is interesting that the Americans also said that the boycott was the action of “unfriendly aliens in a friendly port.” The British however, refused to take action because no laws had been broken.”

“When Westerners arrived in Singapore, they were quickly reminded of whose “side” they were on in multi-racial, multicultural Singapore. They socialized in clubs and hotels that had clearly defined or implied racial barriers. The Tanglin Club, Cricket Club and Swimming Club only accepted “Whites.” They could negotiate business deals with Chinese businessmen in the morning but could not seal the deals with lunch at their clubs.

Racial exclusivity went beyond just the clubs. General Hospital had a “European” ward. Hotels and restaurants imposed a racial divide. The Raffles Hotel drove Asians away through dress requirements, rudeness and poor service. The Hotel L’Europe was for whites only. At the movies, Europeans sat upstairs in the “dress circle” and “Asiatics” sat downstairs. Even the Botanical Gardens made it clear that Asians were not welcome. It would seem the only places where the races mixed socially were at the racetrack and in the dance halls and cabarets.”

WWII

“Germany had conquered France and Holland, thus Britain could expect no help from them in defending Southeast Asia from Japan. More importantly, the administration of Indochina was controlled by Japan because it was an ally of Germany. The Germans had established a puppet government in France, known as the Vichy government. This pro-German French government ruled Indochina and allowed the Japanese to build air fields and military staging depots in what is now southern Vietnam. The Japanese were no longer 4,023 km (2,500 miles) away. They were just a flight across the South China Sea.”

“Many of the Japanese troops were veterans of the war in China and viewed all Chinese as enemies. The Japanese especially despised the communists because of their spirited defense in China and their participation in anti-Japanese resistance movements in the conquered territories. In the early period of Japanese occupation of Singapore, thousands of Chinese were rounded up and never seen again. The estimates of the number of political executions that took place during Japanese rule run between 20,000 and 120,000, and the vast majority of them were Chinese. This policy eased somewhat as time went on because the Japanese desperately needed the Chinese to keep the economy going, but for most Chinese, the occupation represented three-and-a-half years of fear and suffering.”

“Singapore was to be spun off as a separate colony because its large Chinese population was seen as a political threat to the Malays and also because of its strategic and military importance to Britain.”

The Civil War

“What ensued was the Emergency, a twelve-year guerilla war between communist insurgents and the Malayan government backed by British Commonwealth troops. The conflict drew its name from the fact that the civil government had declared a state of emergency in order to assume extraordinary powers to fight the communists. Perhaps more importantly, by calling it the Emergency and not a war, it was possible for businessmen to collect for damage to property from insurance companies. The fight against the MCP was directed by civilian authorities with the support of the military and thus was a “police action.” To the thousands of British, Australian, New Zealand, Fijian and African troops stationed in Malaya, these semantics meant nothing. They fought and died to prevent the communists from taking over Malaya.

Once the decision to fight was made, the communists went back into the jungle and dug up the arms they had hidden at the end of the war with this eventuality in mind. An irony is that many of their weapons had been supplied by the British. The communists proclaimed that their goals were to end British rule and create a democratic, socialist Malaya. Calling themselves the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), they were 6,000 to 8,000 strong, many of them veterans of the fight against the Japanese.

The MRLA had a natural base among the Chinese squatter community.”

“The idea was to relocate the half million Chinese squatters into “new villages” far from the jungles that sheltered the MRLA. The plan had two goals — to protect them from the MRLA, which would dry up the supply routes and sources of recruits for the insurgents, and to win Chinese support by providing housing, schools and clinics. For the first time, the squatters had running water, electricity, sewage and other modern utilities. Thus the government was cutting off MRLA support and at the same time, winning the loyalty of the people the communists needed to continue their struggle.

After increasing the number of security forces and cutting off most support for the guerrillas, the military moved into the jungle to attack their main camps and communication lines. Long-range jungle patrols supplied by air drove the MRLA deeper and deeper into the jungle, effectively taking away its offensive capacity, and by 1954, it was no longer a serious military threat.”

“The fact that the Emergency was directed by the police and civilians had important ramifications for post-independence Malaya and Singapore. Police primacy reduced the role of the army and established the principle that the military was subservient to civilian authority. In Southeast Asia today, it is only in Malaysia and Singapore that the army has never played a significant political role. This is a legacy of the anti-communist effort.”

Independence

“The Indians made up only 7 or 8 percent of the population, but the Indian community’s inability to play an important political role after the war was also the result of its being divided. About half were Tamil-educated plantation workers who were isolated from the urban half of the community. Some urban Indians were part of an English-speaking, white-collar elite while others provided much of the manual labor in the cities. The three groups did not have much contact with one another, and unlike the Chinese, they did not have the clan, dialect and trade associations to bring them together.”

“The country was to be a constitutional monarchy with its king elected from the nine sultans, meaning that the head of state would always be a Malay. The king was given the responsibility of safeguarding the special position of the Malays. The monarchy created was unlike any in the world. The king of Malaya, later Malaysia, was to serve for a term of five years. When his term was up, the sultans would select another of their peers to serve the next term. There was also a second in command to reign when the king was unavailable, a vice-king so to speak. The custom was and still is that the states take turns to provide the country’s monarch.

Second, the state religion would be Islam. Other religions could be practiced but were barred from converting Malays who are Muslim by birth. Thus Islam would be maintained with government sanction as a unifying force for Malays.

Third, Malay would be the official and national language. English was accepted as an official language of the government and the courts for a transitional period of ten years, but after this period, the business of govenment was to be conducted in Malay.

Fourth, the formal recognition of the special position of the Malays was written into the constitution. This special position translated into reality in a number of ways. Large areas of land that had been reserved for the Malays under the British were maintained. There were quotas for admission into the civil service that guaranteed Malay dominance of the bureaucracy. In 1952, an agreement had been reached to allow non-Malays into public service but at a ratio of four Malays to every one non-Malay, and this was continued. There were also quotas on the issuing of licenses for the operation of certain businesses and services, such as taxi licenses, fishing boat permits and timber concessions. Malays were also to receive preference in government contracts and educational opportunities, including seholarships and priority in entering tertiary institutions.

Informally, UMNO and the immigrant parties agreed that electoral boundaries would be drawn and Alliance Party candidates selected in such a way that a Malay majority in parliament would always be guaranteed, and thus the prime minister would also be a Malay. Evidence of this is still seen decades later. For example, in the 1982 election, the Petaling constituency in Selangor, which was urban and had a Chinese majority, had a total voting roll of 114,704, while Kuala Krai, which was Malay and rural, contained 24,445 voters, yet each district had one member of parliament. In the 1986 and 1995 elections, 70 percent of the seats in parliament represented Malay majority constituencies, ensuring Malay parliamentary dominance. UMNO and the other parties also agreed that the police and army would continue to be largely Malay. Finally, it was agreed that a concerted effort would be made to raise the economic position of the Malays.

In return for going along with the safeguards for the Malay position, what did the Chinese receive? Laws made it possible for virtually all immigrants to become citizens. By the 1959 election, the Malay percentage of the electorate had dropped from 80 percent to about 58 percent as many immigrants had become citizens under the new laws. A second concession was the right of immigrant races to maintain educational institutions in their mother tongues. It was agreed that at the primary school level, the Chinese and Indians could study in Chinese- and Tamil-language schools. This concession and the guarantee of religious freedom were key to assuring the immigrant races that they could maintain and pass on their own unique cultures.

Informally, it was agreed that there would be no large-scale attempt by the government to redistribute wealth. Private property would be respected and, not withstanding the government’s affirmative action programs, free enterprise would continue. Attempts to lift the Malays economically at the expense of the Chinese and Indians would be avoided.”

“For over a century, Singapore had been the administrative center for the Straits Settlements and later British Malaya. The Malayan Union proposal and the 1948 Federation of Malaya that replaced it included Penang and Melaka but excluded Singapore. The Malayan administrative center had shifted to Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore remained a British colony. Many Singaporeans objected to this move because they saw themselves as part of Malaya. For the next fifteen years, most Singapore politicians would be committed to finding a future for Singapore as part of Malaya.”

“Malaya had inherited an established administrative structure that included a capable, well-educated civil service. The peaceful transfer of power from the British to the Malayans had taken place smoothly, without the upheaval and recriminations that often take place when governments change leadership.

Many British civil servants remained in Malaya, which ensured an orderly Malayanization of the government. For example, the last British chiefs of staff in the Malayan/Malaysian navy and air force did not retire until 1967, a full ten years after independence, and the last British judge did not step down until 1969. The country faced a relatively prosperous future with tin, rubber, and palm oil providing the foundation for export earnings and economic growth. While there were poor people in the country, it was not the abject poverty associated with much of the developing world at this time. There was a well-developed infrastructure of roads, railroads, and communications that would be key to economic growth.

Finally, there was for the most part peace and stability in the country. The communist threat was reduced to nuisance raids across the Thai border, and the government could ensure law and order — a far cry from many other emerging nations.”

Singapore & Borneo

“This organization formed a partnership between organized labor and government. No strikes were to be called except with the approval of the NTUC and by extension, the government. In the early 1960s, it had a competitor in the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), which was led by much more radical forces. Over time, a combination of job expansion and the arrests of many of the leaders of the SATU and its member unions gave the NTUC dominance over the labor union movement. The subsequent decline in strikes and confrontations added greatly to Singapore’s draw among foreign businessmen.

The government also invested heavily in creating a business-friendly infrastructure. Millions of dollars were poured into expanding the harbor and airport, developing the best communications network in Southeast Asia, building new roads and expanding public services. At the same time as these physical changes took place, there was a big drive for an honest and efficient government. Graft and corruption were rooted out, and capable and well-educated people brought into government. The Public Service Commission did this job admirably. Evidence of the PAP’s commitment to a well-run government is that between 30 and 50 percent of the yearly graduates from Singapore’s universities were drawn into government service. In its efforts to develop the economy, the government was determined to nurture the best and brightest of its citizens.

Singapore’s message was this: Things work in our country. When you deal with the government, you don’t have to bribe anyone, and you don’t have to wait an eternity to get things done. When you mail a letter, it will reach its destination; flights will leave on time; cargo will be cleared quickly and honestly. The government actively courted foreign businessmen by offering financial incentives. The Economic Development Board (EDB) became the lead vehicle in convincing foreigners to invest in Singapore. Through offices in New York, Tokyo, London, Frankfurt and Houston, the EDB offered a virtual menu of attractive incentives – tax holidays for up to ten years, financial joint ventures to reduce risks and help in promoting products outside Singapore. Industrial parks offered ready-to-use factories or land at inexpensive prices. There were tariffs if a company wanted to produce for the local market. The combination of Singapore’s work force, infrastructure and incentives was the foundation for three decades of incredible economic growth.”

“An equally impressive effort to solve Singapore’s social and economic problems was its public housing program. High-rise, low-cost public housing had been introduced before 1959 under the aegis of the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT). It hardly made a dent in the demand for housing, but its 20,000-plus units had introduced the concept of apartment living. The PAP took the idea, changed its name to the Housing and Development Board (HDB) and remade Singapore’s landscape. The millions spent and the number of apartments built in two decades was breathtaking. Entire new cities were built and communities created. By the 1980s, over 80 percent of Singaporeans lived in HDB apartments.

That it successfully housed a nation is one of the enduring legacies of the PAP, but the HDB program was much more than a housing project. Singapore’s public housing effort was probably one of the most impressive and successful feats of social engineering in modern times. In the early years of the HDB, the primary objective had been to provide inexpensive rental apartments. Solving the problems of overcrowding and dismal living conditions were then national priorities, but as time went by, the HDB began to deal with the communal nature of Singapore. Racial quotas were established block by block and community by community. The people of Chinatown and the kampung were dispersed throughout the island in apartments that reflected the racial makeup of the overall society. The hope was that by breaking up the racial concentrations of the past and forcing one race to live next to another in HDB estates, the barriers among the races would be torn down. They were to see others as neighbors, not as Chinese or Malay or Indian. The mixing of races also ensured that politicians could not appeal to racial enclaves to become elected to parliament, effectively eliminating the race card from politics.

There were economic repercussions as well. The very scope and size of the housing projects provided jobs for thousands of Singaporeans and business for construction companies and contractors. Another economic spinoff was the creation of a strong work ethic. As the city redeveloped, less expensive housing alternatives to HDB housing disappeared. A person could no longer fall back on the family and kampung if out of work. Singaporeans had to work to keep and pay for their apartments.

The HDB program was important in creating a national identity. By the mid-1960s, the most acute dimensions of the housing shortage had been tackled, and the emphasis shifted from providing rental apartments to selling them to the people. Home ownership became a key ingredient in convincing people they had a stake in the country. If it had assets in Singapore, this immigrant society would feel a greater loyalty to its new country. It was also hoped that home ownership would lead to pride in the respective communities and a desire to maintain the security and value of homes. Some have contrasted this with the United States, where they believe the rental nature of the country’s public housing program has contributed to urban decline. It has been said that since these Americans do not own their homes, they care little about their upkeep or their communities.”

“As Singapore moved from being a British colony to self-rule, a key concern was its identity. The government at the time envisioned a Malayan identity. From their early days in politics, the leaders of the PAP had felt that Singapore’s separation from Malaya in 1946 had been an artificial and temporary measure.”

“The early actions of the PAP leaders sent clear signals to the Malay leadership of their desire to merge and accept Malay political ascendancy. Singapore’s first yang di-pertuan negara was Yusof bin Ishak, a Malay whose office had a Malay title. Malay was made Singapore’s first national language and had been introduced into the schools as a compulsory language. The 1959 constitution recognized Malays as the original inhabitants of Singapore and acknowledged their special position.”

“After the 1959 election, Singapore leaders made a concerted effort to convince the Tunku, UMNO and the Alliance to bring them on board. Initially, these overtures were spurned by the Malay leadership. The admission of Singapore would change the racial arithmetic of the country. A merger of Malaya and Singapore would make the Chinese the single largest racial group and, regardless of the gestures of Malay symbols, the leadership of UMNO was concerned about the extremists within the PAP. Their Chinese chauvinistic views on language and education worried the Malay leaders. After spending over a decade fighting Chinese communists in the jungle, UMNO did not want to let them in the back door to participate in Malayan affairs.

In 1961, the Tunku did an about-face and made a proposal for the creation of Malaysia, a nation consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo. One reason for his change of heart was that the British were pushing the idea. The concept of a federation of British possessions in the archipelago had surfaced a number of times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but had never gained much support. By the early 1960s, however, the British were looking for a way to withdraw politically but leave behind a structure that would be friendly to their economic and strategic interests.

The concept of a larger federation appealed to a sufficient number of the UMNO leadership. Bringing in Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak, which had large Malay and indigenous populations, would offset Singapore’s Chinese majority. The prospect of an independent Chinese island led by radicals such as Lim Chin Siong posed a threat of renewed political and racial disorder to the entire area. The Tunku felt that these radical elements could be more easily controlled if Singapore was a part of a larger federation run by the Malays. Lee Kuan Yew shared this view and never tired of using it in his dealings with Malaya.”

“Political activity in the two Borneo territories accelerated dramatically with the proposed creation of Malaysia in 1961. The British were all for the incorporation of North Borneo and Sarawak into a larger federation. Sarawak had a population of 750,000 people and North Borneo 400,000. Their small populations, underdeveloped economies and lack of modern infrastructure meant that any kind of real self-rule was highly improbable. British support and guidance would be needed for a long time. Britain, however, was trying to divest itself of its colonial responsibilities. Britain in the 1960s could no longer afford an empire.

Reaction to the Malaysia proposal in the Borneo states was initially somewhat negative. There were many objections and questions. Were the people of Borneo going to exchange rule by British colonial administrators for that of the Malays from the peninsula? If this was going to be the case, they wanted no part of it. Missionaries in both states had been highly successful among the indigenous and Chinese populations, and the percentage of Christians in Borneo was much higher than in the peninsula. They feared that Islam would remain the national religion under the new proposal. The Chinese in both territories were satisfied with their existing place in society and feared being relegated to the second class political position of their counterparts in Malaya. Both territories were economically and educationally backward and distrusted a Malay government whose developmental priorities were to the rural Malay population in the peninsula.

The only group from which there was support for the Malaysia proposal was the Malay community. The benefits for them were obvious. They would be benefactors of the special position of the Malays in the federal constitution. Since they were a minority community in both Borneo states, the Malays felt that Malaysia was an avenue to political and economic power.”

“What did it take to convince leaders such as Stephens and Ong that joining Malaysia was not detrimental to the interests of their states? The final arrangement gave the Borneo states a considerable degree of autonomy in many areas. They were given power over immigration to allay fears of being overpowered by migrants from other parts of the peninsula. This created an odd situation after the merger in which visitors to West Malaysia (on the peninsula) had to get separate visas for East Malaysia (on Borneo), and people moving from one part of the country to another, even between Sabah and Sarawak, had to obtain the approval of a state government.

The imposition of Malay as the single national language of government and education was delayed for ten years. English would hold equal footing with Malay, and any later changes would require approval by the Borneo states. These states would keep their own civil services for at least the immediate future and would have control over their own education policies. To allay the fears of non-Muslims, it was agreed that Islam would not be the state religion, and in answer to apprehension about Malay dominance, both states were given over-representation in the new federal parliament. For example, North Borneo’s population of about half a million people had greater representation than Singapore with its two million people and other states in the peninsula with similar populations. In addition to this, the indigenous populations would be offered the same Bumiputera status as the Malays in Malaya with the same constitutional benefits. These concessions were sufficient to convince most leaders that Malaysia was going to be of benefit to North Borneo and Sarawak.”

“The new Federation of Malaysia came into existence on September 16, 1963 with Tunku Abdul Rahman as its first prime minister. It was not quite as grand as had been originally envisaged since Brunei had decided not to join at the last minute. From within, Malaysia faced the challenge of a complicated racial makeup. It had to deal with the further fragmentation of its population with the inclusion of new groups from Borneo, as well as the challenge of absorbing Singapore’s Chinese population.

The sultan of Brunei had decided against joining Malaysia for financial reasons. In the 1920s and 1930s, large reserves of oil had been discovered in Brunei. With a population of less than a quarter million people, Brunei’s economic future was bright. If it joined Malaysia, the sultan feared that significant amounts of Brunei’s oil revenue would be diverted to the federal government in Kuala Lumpur in the form of taxes and revenue sharing. This was too much to give up. It is doubtful whether his son Hassanal Bolkiah, the present sultan of Brunei, would have become one of the world’s richest men today if the country had entered Malaysia.

Joining Malaysia would also have brought about greater democratization of Brunei’s political system since Malaysia was a democracy.”

“Also, the sultan of Brunei was not pleased with his place in the line to be a future king of Malaysia. Brunei was to be the tenth state whose sultan would be eligible to be king of the country, and the sultans of the peninsula had made it clear that Brunei would have to wait its turn. Not foreseeing the prestige of being king in his lifetime, added to his other concerns, prompted the sultan of Brunei to continue his relationship with Britain as a protectorate rather than join Malaysia. Brunei achieved full independence in 1984.”

“Differences between the PAP and the Alliance took on greater significance as time went on. Some of the problems revolved around economic issues. Singapore wanted the peninsula as a market for its growing manufacturing sector, but negotiations for a common market proceeded slowly. Malaysia’s fledgling factories feared the Singapore competition. Differences also surfaced over taxes and the amount of Singapore’s contribution to the federal budget. These issues had not been defined well in the lead-up to merger, and conflicting perceptions caused discord.

The relationship between the PAP and the ruling Alliance Party became worse when the PAP entered peninsular politics. When Malaysia was being formed, the Alliance thought it had an agreement that the PAP would stay out of politics in the peninsula, at least in the near future. The Tunku, being sensitive to Malay politicians’ fear of the Chinese from Singapore, felt that the PAP should not have a high profile in the Alliance’s backyard.”

“Racial sensitivities were further inflamed by race riots that broke out between Malays and Chinese in Singapore in 1964. The army was called in and curfews were imposed to quell two episodes of violent disorder. In July and September that year, over five hundred people were injured in the intercommunal violence, and twenty-two people were killed. Singapore leaders saw the riots as the result of agitation by an extreme wing of UMNO, which was determined to undermine the legitimacy of the PAP government. Malay leaders blamed the riots on the PAP’s use of sensitive racial issues to score political points.”

“Lee’s call for more equal rights flew in the face of the arrangement made by the MCA, MIC, and UMNO to create Malaysia. The agreements had been negotiated between the Straits Chinese (MCA) and the Malay elite. In essence, it appeared that Lee was trying to renegotiate the immigrant terms of the Malaysian social contract. The MCA could only support a constitution they themselves helped negotiate. The PAP had to go.

For the third time, British support and intervention helped save Lee Kuan Yew’s political career. In 1957, the British had supported Lim Yew Hock’s arrest of the PAP radicals; in 1963, they had supported the arrest of Barisan Sosialis leaders in Operation Cold Store. This time British Prime Minister Harold Wilson made it clear that the British would oppose any move against Lee by the Malaysian government, and Wilson had a strong bargaining chip in the form of the Commonwealth troops who were defending Malaysia from Indonesia on the border in Borneo.

In the end, it was the Tunku who faced down those in his party who wanted Lee arrested and determined that the only alternative was for Singapore to leave the federation. The ties that had existed for centuries had to be severed once and for all. In August 1965, Singapore was expelled from Malaysia and became an independent nation. Singapore had to do what most said was impossible – it had to find a future on its own.”

“When parliament reconvened in 1971 to end emergency rule, these principles were incorporated into legislation. The Sedition Act of 1948 was amended to make political use of “sensitive issues” illegal. This amendment took questions of the primacy of the Malay language, the Malay royalty and the special position of the Malays out of the political arena. Any challenge to these issues was treason. The implicit assumption was that the Malays had to accept the participation of the non-Malays in the political life of the country, and this too was a “sensitive issue.””

“Politics in the Borneo states were somewhat more complicated than those in the peninsula. In Sabah and Sarawak, the ethnic communities were fragmented, and in neither state did any one community form a majority of the population. Sarawak was 32 percent Chinese, 31 percent Iban, 23 percent Malay/Melanau and 8 percent Bidayuh. Sabah was 32 percent Kadazandusuns, 30 percent Muslim Bumiputera and 23 percent Chinese. The indigenous people were separated along Muslim and Christian lines. In Sabah, the Kadazandusuns were predominantly Christian, and in Sarawak, there was heavy Christian representation among the Ibans and the Bidayuhs. What this meant was that the chief ministers in these states inevitably came from ethnic and religious minorities, and the Chinese provided the swing vote in determining who would control the state government.”

Conclusion

“Another change that Mahathir sought was to reduce the power and influence of Malay royalty. The sultans had been powerful racial and political symbols of Malay rule in the face of an assertive immigrant population. In the run-up to independence and the first couple of decades thereafter, the sultans had been allies of UMNO, and their families had great influence within the party, but by the 1980s, Malay royalty had begun to lose the loyalty of the political establishment. On several occasions, the sultans angered UMNO by meddling in the appointment of elected officials or by supporting the opposition. They seemed to be anachronistic, feudal symbols in a modernizing world. As Malay numbers grew as a percentage of the overall population, the need for symbols decreased conversely. The increased mobility of the Malays from kampungs to cities and from state to state also weakened the ties between the palace and the people. Political loyalties were more to a party and an active government than to royalty.

In the first decade after independence, Malay business activities tended to be controlled by members of the traditional aristocracy, who parlayed their political connections into choice business deals. A royal title on the board of directors and a word in the right ear opened doors and facilitated government action. As a new class of businessmen from common backgrounds arose, the aristocracy, with its political connections and status, hindered their ability to succeed.

Mahathir made his first move against the royalty in 1983–1984 by proposing a constitutional amendment that would eliminate the powers of the king and sultans to delay legislation and declare a state of emergency. Some objected to this because the power would then be transferred to the prime minister. Others felt the move was too soon because many Malays still had close ties with and affection for their sultans. As a result the powers of the sultans at the state level did not change, but Mahathir did manage to end the king’s right to delay the legislative process at the national level.

In the early 1990s, UMNO made a further assault on royal power. This time the leaders were better prepared. In a well-orchestrated campaign, politicians and the media began saying publicly what had previously only been mentioned in private — that some of the royal families abused their positions. Stories began to appear in the press about royal Christmas parties where liquor flowed freely and about royal princes who committed crimes and were not punished. These tales of expensive cars and lavish lifestyles at public expense began to chip away at the credibility of the royal families. Their government privileges were withdrawn and legislation ended their legal immunity.”

“An irony was that after twenty years of affirmative action and pro-Malay government policies, the Chinese had almost doubled their share of ownership. A case can be made that the inclusion of Malays as more active participants in the modern economy had not come at the expense of the immigrant communities. High tides had raised all the boats this time, at least in the realm of shareholdings.

National growth led to higher incomes for most Malaysians. Household incomes during this twenty-year period increased threefold, and the number of people living on incomes below the poverty line dropped from 49 percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 1990. In the 1990s, with increased growth rates, these improved at an even faster rate.”

“The social change brought by the changing economy had inspired in many a closer relationship with their religion. This could be superficially seen by the tremendous increase in the number of women wearing the tudong (head scarf) and increased mosque attendance and pilgrims going on the Hajj. These actions indicated the fact that for many Malays the answer to the challenge of modernity was to embrace Islam more tightly.

This Islamic revival was actively encouraged by the government, especially by Mahathir. In the 1990s, a host of government programs and activities tried to make Islam a unifying force in the Malay community. Islamic civilization was taught in schools; the government actively encouraged and supported those who wished to go on the Hajj. An Islamic university was established. There was strong government support for Muslim youth and cultural groups, as well as government legislation that enforced Islamic laws against alcohol and unacceptable sexual relationships, such as khalwat. (In essence, khalwat refers to improper physical relationships between members of the opposite sex. Depending on how strictly it is defined, it may include everything from holding hands in public to adultery.)”

“Estimates of the number of addicts in Malaysia ran in the hundreds of thousands, big numbers for a country of then twenty million people. They were especially striking in the face of the stringent drug laws, which included mandatory death penalties for trafficking or possessing relatively small quantities of drugs. Malaysia executed more people per capita than almost any democracy in the world. Most of the executions were for drug offenses, and yet the problem continued to plague the country.”

“These daunting challenges were compounded by the announcement in 1967 that Britain planned to withdraw its military forces from Singapore by 1972. On the heels of the exit from Malaysia, this was devastating news. The contribution of the British forces to Singapore’s economy was significant — 15 to 20 percent of its national income. The British withdrawal also meant that Singapore would have to build its own military establishment with people who for the most part had no military traditions, experience or national loyalty.”

“Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues viewed Singapore as a society fighting for survival in a hostile world. They believed its small size and manpower base could not afford the luxury of a liberal democracy in the Western sense. Competing political factions would drain Singapore of the unity it needed to develop a national identity and reorder its economy. Its best and brightest were precious resources that would be squandered if they were divided by a competitive political party system.

The social contract articulated by the PAP was that the people of Singapore would accept more government control, give up some of their individual rights and work hard. In return, the government would create an environment that would deliver prosperity and a good quality of life.

The ramifications of the social contract were felt first on the economic front. Singapore had found that good government, a developed infrastructure and an attractive work force were successful draws to foreign investment. With its exit from Malaysia, Singapore had to convince investors that this new country was a safe place to put their money and that it was stable socially and politically. Given Singapore’s recent past, stability was not necessarily certain. While the labor force was well-educated, hard working and relatively inexpensive, the unions had a confrontational and disorderly reputation. To counter this image, in the 1960s, the government had moved to curb the powers of organized labor. Some of the radicalism within the trade union movement had been dampened by the arrests of many of its leaders between 1963 and 1966. Leaderless and under strong government pressure, the Barisan Sosialis union group, SATU, began to fall apart.”

“The government was also determined to instill a strong work ethic in the work force. The social and economic safety nets that exist in many countries were not available in Singapore. There were no unemployment benefits, and welfare benefits were meager and went only to the truly destitute. Government assistance for citizens was basically limited to subsidized public housing, health care and education. There was no free lunch in Singapore.

The British withdrawal, while a blow to Singapore’s economy, offered opportunities as well. The land that had been used by British bases was freed for housing and industrial estates. Given the amount of land involved, this was of significant benefit. For example, the British airfield and installations in Changi became the site of Singapore’s regional hub in the aerospace industry, Changi International Airport. The British also left behind impressive facilities that became the foundations of new industries. The dry dock at the naval base became a center for ship repair and building. The aircraft repair and maintenance facilities at the three British air bases were converted to civilian use. Thus, although the British withdrawal cost jobs, it also created new ones.”

“Two events outside Singapore contributed to its ability to adjust the economy to independence and British withdrawal. Singapore became an important supply and logistics center for the American war effort in Vietnam. The Americans and their South Vietnamese allies needed everything from rope to soap and oil products to toothbrushes. Singapore acted as a middleman to procure what was not being sent from the United States. It has been estimated that the war added more than $100 million a year to Singapore’s economy at a time when it needed funds desperately.

The rise in oil prices as a result of actions in the Middle East in the 1970s gave great impetus to the offshore search for oil in Southeast Asia. Singapore was perfectly placed to become the center of this boom. Although the oil was in Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore became the logistics center, offering an efficient, comfortable place in which to set up corporate headquarters. The island’s airports and sea ports supplied the rigs, and its new shipyards and industrial estates built and repaired the rigs and other equipment.”

“Political associations were not allowed, and student unions were banned from political activities. Each year, students had to obtain “certificates of suitability” for re-admission, which depended on their political activities or rather, lack of them. In a society with limited opportunities for higher education, this was a great motivator for students to hit the books rather than the streets.

The belief that Singapore could only afford one voice for its vision of the future was also reflected in the creation of a monopoly on the media and other sources of information. Rather than act as a check on the government and a channel for alternative views as is the case in the West, the media was seen as a tool for creating a national identity and unity. In the eyes of the PAP, the media’s job was not to criticize the government but to help it get out its message to the people. Television and radio were owned and run by government agencies and were active participants in the PAP agenda.

Until the late 1960s, the newspapers of Singapore were relatively independent and competitive, but in the 1970s, this changed. Editors and reporters of Nanyang Siang Pau, a leading Chinese newspaper, were arrested in 1971 for printing articles that were considered seditious and chauvinistic. Utusan Melayu, the conservative Malay paper pioneered by Yusof bin Ishak, was shut down in 1970 for stirring up sensitive racial issues.”

“Singapore required virtually all males to spend two years in the military and then be available for reserve duty for many years afterward. The potential benefits of this requirement were great. An experience shared by all races, it fostered patriotism, loyalty and the belief that all were responsible for defending the country, and it made a significant impact on generations of Singaporeans.

The growth of Singapore’s military establishment was impressive. While in the 1960s, the single largest government expenditure was education, by the 1980s, that had changed to defense. The government adopted what was called a “poisonous shrimp strategy” — “We may be small, but if you eat us, we will make you very sick.” It invested billions of dollars in creating a modern well-equipped military. Top of the line fighter aircraft from the United States, fast modern tanks from Europe and a modern navy all gave Singapore one of the largest military establishments based on the size of its population in the world.”

“The only two countries that were possible threats to Singapore were of Malay racial and religious origin, and there was concern that Singapore Malays would not have the will to fight Malaysians or Indonesians. Because the loyalties of the Singapore Malays were in doubt, certain units and jobs in the SAF were closed.”

“Between the politics of the NS and the British withdrawal, many traditional service occupations for Malay men were no longer available. The early years of independence saw an increase in unemployment and dead-end manual labor in the Malay community. There were serious drug problems and crime among bored Malay youths, and their loss of status led to a loss of respect in the community. The income levels of Malays fell dramatically in comparison with those of the Chinese. In the 1950s, the average income of most Malays was relatively equal with that of the Chinese. By the early 1970s, when all income levels had increased significantly, the Malay incomes were not nearly as impressive as those of the other races.”

“When the PAP took power in 1959, they banned Playboy and Cosmopolitan magazines, branding them examples of decadent Western “yellow culture.” Jukeboxes and pool tables were also banned as symbols of loose living.

In the 1970s, the government’s anti-Western targets were long hair, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll music. Fearful of what was deemed as a “hippy culture,” a campaign against long-haired males was instituted. In government offices, signs declared that males with long hair would be served last. At the airport and other borders, long-haired males were told to get haircuts or depart. Many discotheques were closed as they were seen as gathering places for the drug culture and anti-social behavior. Numerous popular songs were banned, such as “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds” and “Puff the Magic Dragon” as they were said to have lyrics that promoted drug taking.”

“Four to six parliamentary constituencies were grouped together, and the MPs in those constituencies were to run as a team. The group with the greatest number of votes won all the seats. The rationale was that if Singapore was going to have competitive party politics, then something had to be done to ensure that members of minority groups got into parliament. The redevelopment of Singapore meant that every parliamentary seat had a sizable Chinese majority, and there was a possibility that the minorities would be shut out completely. To this end, each new GRC had to include a Eurasian, a Malay or an Indian as one of its candidates. Opposition politicians claimed that the GRCs were merely a way to ensure PAP control since the groups of districts were determined by a PAP-dominated parliament. The government could easily ensure that districts with high opposition support were married to PAP strongholds, thus making it difficult for opposition candidates to enter parliament as full MPs.”

“Today 95 percent of the Chinese send their children to Chinese primary schools, evidence that language and education, two of the key vehicles in creating a national identity, are still communalized.”

“It runs a dual judicial system. Family and personal law for Muslims is handled by the sharia courts. Other legal matters and in theory all legal matters for non-Muslims are handled by civil courts that are modeled on English and Commonwealth law. It is not always possible to keep these two spheres separate.”

“Other cases have arisen from the fact that syariah courts do not recognize marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims unless the non-believer converts. Out of this have risen a number of cases where marriages have been forced to end and children have been taken away from parents who did not convert. Because these issues mix race and religion, they have taken on great significance in the public eye. There have been other cases of foreigners who have been arrested for khalwat because one was Muslim and the other not — thus they were not married and their physical liaison was forbidden.”

“In the 1990s, Malaysia began building a new administrative capital southwest of Kuala Lumpur. This new government center is called Putrajaya. It is wired with modern fiber optics and cost around RM28 billion. It is part of the Multimedia Supercorridor that includes most of the Klang Valley, the new international airport, research and development facilities, information technologies and other knowledge-based institutions.

This new city had great symbolism. KL was a city originally settled by the Chinese and then turned into an administrative capital by the British. To this very day a majority of the population of the city is Chinese and it is a traditional stronghold of the opposition parties. This was a new capital named after Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra and built by a Malay government, and the very nature of the Malaysian bureaucracy made it a largely Malay city — but a city custom built and wired for the twenty-first century. Also the administrative capital is now separate from the financial capital in Kuala Lumpur, creating space for the commercial sector to grow.”

“Government offices were dispersed all over an increasingly commercial city. Consolidating them in one place would definitely improve intra-governmental communication.”