Top Quotes: “Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present” — T.M. Devine

“The Union of England and Scotland in 1707 was a marriage of convenience founded on pragmatism, expediency, competing national patriotisms and realpolitik.”

“Historically the idea of union between two old enemies had a long pedigree in Scotland dating back to the sixteenth century. While the survival of the independent and sovereign kingdom was by far the dominant belief in the early modern period, some Scottish thinkers of the time did argue for a much closer association, not simply to ensure more peaceful relationships, but in order to provide an alternative to the historic English aspiration of achieving hegemony over the entire Britain Isles. The Reformation and the emergence of Protestantism in both countries, albeit in different forms, gave added impetus to this discourse.”

“The Scottish political class, casting envious eyes on England’s growing wealth, continued to be very attracted by ‘ane union of traid’. Some negotiations to this end took place in 1668, 1670 and again in 1688–9 but without any significant results.

The insurmountable obstacle was England’s complete opposition to the surrender of any of its commercial privileges and advantages to a poor country that could offer precious little in return. The conventional wisdom in Europe at the time was the mercantilist concept that resources in the world were finite and that one state could only gain economic advantage over another either by making aggressive war or by passing tough protectionist legislation to safeguard its trade. For much of the later seventeenth century, therefore, far from ceding any trading rights to the Scots, England tightened up customs regulations even further and the Royal Navy became more proactive against the increased levels of Scottish smuggling and evasion in the Atlantic trades.”

“Conflict in the economic sphere was intensified by the collapse of the Company of Scotland’s ill-fated expedition to Darien in central America. This enterprise was launched in a mood of great national optimism in 1695, but by March 1700 the attempt to found a Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Panama to trade with the Pacific and Atlantic simultaneously had ended in complete disaster. The reasons for the catastrophe were many, ranging from poor planning to the lethal effects of tropical disease on the first settlers. But the political blame was laid squarely at England’s door by revengeful Scots. English investment had been withdrawn from the original undertaking as a result of mercantile and political pressure from London. Meanwhile the possibility of bringing relief to the Scottish settlement in 1699 had come to naught, in large part because the London government, conscious of the vital diplomatic need to maintain Spanish support against France, refused to provide much-needed provisions or support.”

“The costs of supplying British forces in Europe grew exponentially, to which were added expenditures in support of continental allies in the war against France. Inevitably, land, excise and cess taxes in both England and Scotland had to rise.

This background of economic crisis and international war is central to understanding the origins of union.”

“Payment of arrears to selected individuals was just as much part and parcel of effective management as handing over direct cash inducements in both the Edinburgh and Westminster parliaments. The Squadrone benefited handsomely from the distributions. Modern research has also identified as beneficiaries former members of the opposition, such as William Seton of Pitmedden, Sir Kenneth Mackenzie and the Earl of Glencairn, whose rewards may have encouraged a more favourable opinion of union. But not all parliamentarians were susceptible. The voting record of at least 13 members shows that they supported the union without either cash inducement or promise of office. But the loyalty of the Court Party as a whole could not be taken entirely for granted because allegations suggested that some, though enthusiastic for union, were not so enamoured of full incorporation. Support had therefore to be shored up by patronage.”

“Most of the increased revenues from these new fiscal policies were actually retained in Scotland to cover the costs of civil administration and government. But this was not the perception at the time. It seemed on the contrary that increased taxes within the Union were a form of tribute levied on the Scots that was then channelled south to England. Overall, duties rose fivefold between 1707 and 1713. The fact that the much-vaunted post-union economic miracle, so beloved of pro-union pamphleteers, had signally failed to come about, also aggravated the burdens. The Scottish economy for the most part remained in the doldrums in the first decade of union, still suffering from the impact of the crises of the 1690s.”

“The history of Europe was littered with failed unions between countries in close geographical proximity, such as Spain/Portugal and Norway/ Sweden. It was by no means inevitable that the Anglo-Scottish union would prevail.”

“The relationship between Scottish Jacobitism and the survival of the Union was contradictory. On the one hand, some of the negative short-term results of 1707 helped to swell the ranks of Jacobite sympathizers. On the other, the threat of a possible return of the Catholic Stuarts and the monarchical absolutism associated with that dynasty ensured that Presbyterian Scots, who formed the overwhelming majority of the nation, were prepared to endure the provocation of some odious post-Union policies.”

“Scots had been migrating to the (then) English empire before 1707, but the Union soon opened up new opportunities. Indeed, by the time of the American War of Independence (1775–83) several parts of British North America and the West Indies had become virtually surrogate Scottish colonies. By then around 15,000 Gaels had settled in Georgia and the Carolinas, while it is reckoned that over 60,000 Lowland emigrants had made their way to the Chesapeake, the Carolinas and Boston, and perhaps another 15,000 to the sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Even more crucially for the future, middle-class Scottish adventurers, merchants, mariners, military officers and colonial officials were exploiting imperial opportunities not only in the western hemisphere but in the provinces of India.”

“That contrast between Scotland and Ireland became much more clear-cut during the Napoleonic Wars, a conflict that finally ended the epic ‘second Hundred Years War’ with France for global imperial hegemony. Britain was comprehensively victorious and the foundation of Pax Britannica across the oceans of the world was established. But at the time it was a close-run thing. From 1798 to 1805 Napoleon’s all-conquering armies were encamped a few miles across the Channel preparing for invasion. It was at this critical juncture that the Irish committed the ultimate betrayal. The major uprising of 1798, led by the United Irishmen, offered the French the real chance of an effective flank attack and invasion at the hour of England’s greatest peril. They attempted to land troops on three occasions on the Irish coast before that year was out. Two years earlier, in 1796, the French General Hoche, accompanied by Wolfe Tone, had also come very close to successfully bringing 15,000 troops ashore at Bantry Bay.

The contrast with the loyalty of the Scots could not have been more apparent. Already over-represented among the officer class in the field armies, 52,000 Scots also joined the ranks of the volunteers. With around 15 per cent of the British population, Scots accounted for 36 per cent of all the volunteer soldiery in 1797, 22 per cent in 1801 and 17 per cent in 1804. Scottish loyalty and the Scottish contribution in blood to final victory over France had cemented the Union by 1815.”

“The faithful allegiance to Catholicism became not only a badge of religious identity in most of Ireland but of national identity as well. This made England very vulnerable when its main continental enemies from the sixteenth century were the leading Catholic powers of France and Spain. It was fear of Ireland becoming the proverbial backdoor into England that prompted three violent waves of colonization in the seventeenth century.”

“At the time of the Union, Scotland was also already overwhelmingly Protestant. There were differences between the reformed traditions in both countries but nonetheless a shared Protestantism in the face of hostile Catholic powers became a powerful ideological bond between them. The Scots were also able to strike a good bargain in 1707, gaining free access to the English domestic market (more than ten times the size of their own) and the opportunities for even greater profit as the British empire began to expand across the globe. Ireland, on the other hand, was treated like a foreign country for customs purposes and did not achieve freedom of trade with the rest of Britain until its union in 1801. The rapid expansion of the Scottish economy eventually occurred in response to these commercial privileges and was probably the most important single factor facilitating the making of a Scottish/ British identity in the country. At the same time, while Ireland was garrisoned by a standing army and governed by a colonial bureaucracy, the Scots ruled themselves within the Union for most of the eighteenth century.”

“Like most European governments of the time, the English state spent most of its resources in waging war or in preparation for future wars. It was reckoned that over most of the eighteenth century between 75 and 80 per cent of annual British government expenditure went on current military needs or to service debt accruing from previous wars. For Britain, far and away the biggest outlay was on the navy, the ‘senior service’, vital for the home defence of an island people and for the prosecution of a ‘blue water’ strategy around the world, safeguarding trade routes and establishing secure overseas bases for the protection of colonies. Sir Walter Raleigh’s dictum of over a century before still rang true: ‘Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade of the world; whosoever commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.’ The problem was, however, that navies were fearsomely expensive. Wooden ships rotted fast, maintenance costs were enormous, and the huge dockyards and shipyards required for repair and construction inevitably became a major drain on the public purse. It was no surprise that abundant finance rather than military force per se was reckoned to be the crucial sinew of war.

The English state had been pursuing a policy of expanding economic and military resources since around 1650. The process was virtually complete by the time of the Union of 1707 and it made available to the army and navy vast sums for the prosecution of war. The key components included a huge extension of the national debt, sharp increases in taxation, a government bank (the Bank of England) and the flotation of long-term loans on the London capital market that also attracted funds from the Continent. No other state in Europe — apart perhaps from the United Provinces (the Netherlands), which did not link its mercantile prowess as effectively to war strategy as England — was quite as successful in this financial transformation. The costs of the economic revolution were borne mainly by taxes, especially customs and excise on imported and home-produced goods. This was the main reason that Scotland was faced with an increased tax burden after 1707.”

“In 1820, British dominion already encompassed a fifth of the world’s population.”

“It was the chances of achieving such riches in India and elsewhere in the empire that went a long way to committing the loyalty of the Scottish elite to union long before the end of the eighteenth century.”

“By the early nineteenth century, unionism also seemed everywhere triumphant. The public buildings and streets of the new townscapes recorded names, memorials and statues commemorating British union, British empire, British heroes and British wars.”

“The Scottish Burgh Reform Act of 1833 vested the management of the towns in the broad middle class. It was a crucial piece of legislation that, taken together with the administrative changes mentioned above, created a more powerful local state run by the Scottish bourgeoisie and reflecting their political and religious values. It was this local state, rather than a distant and usually indifferent Westminster authority, that in effect routinely governed Scotland. The absence of any form of political nationalism in Victorian Scotland is often remarked upon, especially in contrast to the history of Ireland and the European Continent at the time. But there would have been little reason for the Scots to adopt a nationalism hostile to the British state.”

“Between 1825 and 1938 over 2.3 million Scots left their homeland for overseas destinations. This placed the country with Ireland and Norway in the top three of European countries with the highest levels of net emigration per capita throughout that period. The emigrants had three main destinations — the USA (after 1783), British North America (Canada) and Australia.”

“At the time there was little real awareness or recognition of the tremendous sacrifices of the Russian people, who suffered 27 million dead on the Eastern Front and whose armies inflicted 92 per cent of the total casualties suffered by all German forces during the Second World War.”

“Between 1979 and 1981, Scottish industry lost around a fifth of all its jobs. Manufacturing capacity fell all over the UK, but the decline in Scotland at 30.8 per cent between 1976 and 1987 was greatest of all.”

“The economic policies of her successive governments were intended to be implemented across all parts of the UK without fear or favour. The strategy was to be pan-British; all nationalities and regions were required to take the same medicine because, for Mrs Thatcher, the UK was a unitary state.”

“Almost everything in the new Prime Minister’s personal and political agenda represented a comprehensive challenge to Scottish society. Scotland was a nation with a long and proud history that had entered into joint union with England in 1707. Its people were not likely to take kindly to being treated like any other region of Britain, especiallv during a time of serious recession.”

“The parliament that had now been resoundingly approved would have power over all matters apart from foreign policy, defence, macro-economic policy, social security, abortion and broadcasting. It could raise or lower the basic rate of tax by 3p, or £450 million in total. Although Westminster would continue to have responsibility for relations with Europe, there would also be a Scottish representative office in Brussels and Scottish ministers could be expected to take part in the UK delegation.”

“The Queen formally opened the new Parliament at Holyrood on 1 July 1999.”

“Unusually for a nationalist movement in Europe, the SNP remained committed to a left-of-centre agenda, even as New Labour moved in a different political direction, albeit with a dash of what became known as ‘Neo-Liberalism with a Heart’. In 1995 the full extent of the SN’s commitment to ‘civic nationalism’ also became apparent. The existing policy for an independent Scotland had envisaged a bill of rights that guaranteed fundamental freedoms and outlawed discrimination in terms of race, gender and religion. The approach now went further. Citizenship in an independent Scotland was to be founded not on race or heritage but on residence in Scotland alone. Few nationalist parties are associated with this degree of protection and assured status for ethnic minorities within a nation state. As part of this agreement, attempts were made to develop more rapprochement with the so-called ‘New Scots’, particularly Asians and Catholics of Irish descent, where in the west of Scotland the Nationalists were already winning more support among ethnicities traditionally associated with Labour. A group called New Scots for Independence was formed.”

“Catholics had achieved broad occupational and educational parity in Scotland. The old fear of the SNP was disappearing as the Nationalists started to cultivate the Catholic community and Alex Salmond publicly praised the merits of the denominational school system, though it remained controversial in the opinion of many Scots. The President of the Scottish Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Cardinal Tom Winning, dismissed any threat from the SNP and even on occasion spoke positively about Scottish independence. By 2000 the levels of Scottish identity among Catholics were comparable with the rest of the nation and, strikingly, support for devolution and independence soon became higher than among churchgoing Protestants. By 1992, Catholic backing for Labour had fallen to 53 per cent of the Catholic electorate. Thereafter the haemorrhage from Labour gathered speed. In the referendum of 2014 support for independence came strongly from parts of west-central Scotland with substantial Catholic minorities.”

“”Yes’ campaigners also anticipated a universally hostile press as the battle for votes was joined. They were not to be disappointed, though even they were perhaps surprised by the relentlessly venomous nature of many of the attacks. The Daily Mail headlined on the ‘savage racialism’ of the Nationalists while the Daily Telegraph condemned their ‘lies, smears and intimidation’. Other choice headlines included ‘thuggish nationalism’, ‘Forces of Darkness would love Scottish split from the UK’, and ‘independence a victory for the enemies of freedom’ (this last a bizarre quote from Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia). A veritable litany of alleged disasters that would overwhelm the nation in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote was reiterated on a daily basis in most of the press: a massive budget deficit leading to huge cuts in the NHS, job losses on an enormous scale as businesses fled Scotland, and an existential threat to pension provisions — all and more were predicted.

The non-aligned agency Press Data reckoned from its analyses of stories that made the news during the campaign that the ratio in favour of the unionist cause was almost 4:1. The Scottish-based Sunday Herald was the only newspaper in the UK that eventually came out for independence. Its sister paper, The Herald, did not follow suit but still managed to maintain a fairly balanced approach.”

“The unionist parties rapidly cobbled together a new deal for Scotland to try to outflank the Nationalists as the clock ticked towards the day of reckoning. A so-called VOW was printed on mock-vellum on the front page of the best-selling and Labour-supporting Daily Record tabloid two days before polling day. It was signed by David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband and promised ‘extensive new powers’ to Scotland if the nation voted ‘No’. Gordon Brown, the former Labour Prime Minister who had done much to bring this accord about, promised in a speech ‘a modern form of Scottish Home Rule within the United Kingdom’. The pledge was to be delivered within a tight time frame. The plan would be published by 30 November 2014, St Andrew’s Day, and the draft legislation was to be ready by 25 January 2015, Burn’s Night. This was constitutional planning on the hoof. It was a remarkable and humiliating volte-face by the Prime Minister in particular. David Cameron had strenuously opposed the third question on devo-max in the referendum. Now he had been forced to concede something just like that.”

“Soume 4,285,323 residents in Scotland registered to vote in thee referendum, induding 109,000 16-and 17-year-olds who had been specially enfranchised for the occasion. It was the highest voter registration in British history since the introdaction of universal suffrage. The actual turnout on September 2014 was 85 per cent. By way of comparison, the turnout in Scotland in the UK general election of 2010 had been 64 per cent.

Of those registered, 2,001,926 voted ‘No’ (or 55 per cent); 1,617,989 (or 45 per cent) voted ‘Yes’.”

“The future of the economy was the question of paramount importance in the minds of the electorate as the decision was made whether or not to leave the UK. The poorer and those less well off under the Union were early more persuaded that independence would make life better for them. Crudely, in several areas those who had least to lose tended to vote *Yes’. The affluent, on the ther hand, were more impressed by the ‘No’ arguments about the many risks and potential costs of leaving the nion in an uncertain world. They probably also took note of the weaknesses of the ‘Yes’ campaign in relation to the future of the currency, entry to the EU, and a possible flight of capital.”

“The Crown Estate’s economic assets in Scotland, and the revenue generated from these assets, will be transferred to the Scottish Parliament.

This will include the Crown Estate’s Seabed, urban assets, rural estates, mineral and fishing rights and its Scottish foreshore.”

“Quebec in the last Canadian referendum in 1995 came even closer to independense than the Scots in 2014. The ‘No’ campaign in Quebec won by only 50.6 per cent to 49.4 per cent of the vote in that year. Since then, however, though the Parti Québécois still presses for separation of the province, there has not been another independence referendum and the campaign for self-determiration has lost the impetus that it possessed two decades ago.”