Top Quotes: “The Cyprus Problem” – James Ker-Lindsay
Introduction
“For almost sixty years, the small Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been a regular feature in the news. From the anti-colonial uprising against British rule in the 1950s through the emergence of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the 1960s, the Turkish invasion of the island in the 1970s, and the subsequent thirty-year effort by the United Nations to reunite the island, Cyprus has received a disproportionate degree of international attention.
For the most part, this interest has little to do with the intrinsic importance of the island itself. It has no significant mineral wealth. Nor is it a vital transit route to the Middle East, as it once was. Instead, the island’s significance is due to wider geopolitical factors. Throughout the Cold War, conflict on the island had the potential to ignite an armed confrontation between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. More recently, the division of the island has played a central role in Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union. This is significant inasmuch as the relationship between the EU and Turkey could well determine how the union evolves as a regional body and what sort of ties it will have with its neighbours and the wider world.”
“There is some dispute over the origin of the island’s name. A commonly accepted view is that Cyprus takes is name from cuprum, the Latin word for copper. However, it has also been suggested that the name is far older, deriving from the word for copper used by the Eteocypriots, the pre-Hellenic indigenous inhabitants of the island.”
“WHO ARE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS?
The Greek Cypriots are the largest ethnic group in Cyprus. At the time of independence in 1960, when the last official census of the island’s population was carried out, there were 441,568 Greek Cypriots, accounting for 78 percent of the island’s inhabitants. In 2008, the total population of the areas under control of the government stood at 796,900, according to official statistical data. However, this figure includes religious minorities and foreigners, who would account for 15 percent to 20 percent of this total. Accurate population figures taking account of the Turkish Cypriots, the other main community, do not exist. In lieu of accurate new data, the figure of 78 percent is still widely cited as the approximate size of the Greek Cypriot community in relation to the island’s population as a whole.
The first Greek community on the island is generally believed to have been formed by Achaean and Mycenaean Greek settlers who arrived on the island during the middle Bronze Age thirty-five hundred to four thousand years ago.
There they lived alongside the Eteocypriots, the indigenous inhabitants, and, later, the Phoenicians, who established settlements in the ninth century BC.”
“Within the Greek Cypriot community, opinion is divided on the question of identity. At one end of the scale are those Greek Cypriots who see themselves as Greek first and foremost, placing little if any emphasis on a Cypriot identity. They are Greeks who happen to live on the island of Cyprus, just as ‘Cretans’ are accepted as Greeks who happen to live in Crete and ‘Athenians’ are Greeks who live in Athens. Historical circumstances may have denied them a place in the Greek state, but they are no less Greeks than anyone living within Greece.
At the other end of the spectrum are those who prefer to stress their Cypriot identity. They reject any particular emphasis on their ‘Greekness’, although few deny it altogether, opting instead to see themselves as culturally and historically tied to the island of Cyprus above all else. Their allegiance is to Cyprus. Greece is a distant and foreign land. As one might expect, most Greek Cypriots fall between the two positions.
They recognise that they have a Greek identity but see themselves as clearly distinct from the Greeks from Greece. They have a specifically Cypriot character and a distinct Cypriot dialect, and they feel a strong allegiance to their island even though they may still feel a bond, however strong or weak, with Greece.
In many areas, close links do exist. For example, many Greek Cypriots study at Greek universities, and most support the Greek football team when it plays in international competitions. Likewise, many of the television shows and leading music artists that Cypriots watch and listen to are Greek, although there are notable cases of Cypriots achieving stardom in Greece.
Not unsurprisingly, this ambiguous relationship between Greece and Cyprus, or between the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, confuses outsiders. Even foreigners who have lived on the island for many years find it hard to decipher. One of the most common comments one hears concerns the prevalence of the Greek flag. (It should be noted that this has declined significantly since 2004. Now, usually EU flags fly alongside the Cypriot flag on public buildings.) Outsiders often cannot understand why Cyprus, as an independent state, would fly the flag of another country.”
“Were a referendum held tomorrow, it is doubtful that even 5 percent of Greek Cypriots would vote in favour of unification. Very few Greek Cypriots want to give up their independence to become a distant province of Greece.
At one time, such an idea was alluring, but no more. Tied to this is another frequent Turkish Cypriot accusation that Greece controls the Greek Cypriots. Again, this has no basis in reality.
The Greek government has no formal power to determine the decisions of the Greek Cypriots, and there is no evidence to suggest that it tries to exercise control over the Greek Cypriots.
Indeed, if it were to do so, especially on domestic issues, it would be swiftly rebuffed by the Greek Cypriot political leadership and by the wider Greek Cypriot community.”
“Compared to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot community is considerably smaller and has relatively more recent origins. At the time of independence, there were 103,822 Turkish Cypriots. This meant that they amounted to 18 percent of the total population of the island. Again, without new and reliable data, a more accurate contemporary assessment of the relative size of the community cannot be made, and thus the 18 percent figure is still generally used in discussions on the Cyprus issue.
The first members of the community arrived on the island following the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571. In the centuries that followed, many more arrived. Their numbers, bolstered by Greek Cypriots who converted to Islam to gain social and financial benefits (Christians were more heavily taxed), thereby becoming members of the Turkish Cypriot community. This leads many Greek Cypriots to feel that the Turkish Cypriots have less right to be on the island than their community. While the Greek Cypriots do indeed have a longer presence on the island, Turkish Cypriots have nevertheless been in Cyprus for almost 450 years. By all accounts, Cyprus is as much their home now as it is the home of the Greek Cypriots.
As with the Greek Cypriots, there are a range of views within the Turkish Cypriot community as to self-identity.
Some Turkish Cypriots regard themselves as Turks living in Cyprus. Others see themselves as primarily Cypriot. Again, the majority view themselves as falling somewhere between the two positions. The picture is also confused by the arrival of large numbers of settlers from mainland Turkey since 1974. At first, this did not have too serious an effect. By and large, the new arrivals integrated well and readily adapted to Turkish Cypriot customs and ways. (Turkish Cypriots tend to be much less religious and more liberal than Anatolians.) Increasingly, though, this is changing. The pace of immigration-both in terms of those who are given citizenship by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and those who are simply temporary workers- is such that there is a real danger that the Turkish Cypriot community will be swamped and may eventually disappear altogether.”
“Just as the Turkish Cypriots often accuse Greece of influencing the Greek Cypriots, so many Greek Cypriots accuse Turkey of having an undue influence over the Turkish Cypriots.
Indeed, most Greek Cypriot politicians argue that the Turkish Cypriots have no power to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus issue. A settlement can come only from Turkey. But while there is little doubt that Turkey exercises a far greater degree of control over the north than Greece does over the south, things are not quite as straightforward as they might seem. On the one hand, it is hard to deny that Turkey wields significant power over the Turkish Cypriots. After all, it provides for their security with thirty thousand to forty thousand Turkish troops based on the island. Moreover, because of the economic isolation faced by the Turkish Cypriots as a result of the decision to unilaterally declare independence in 1983, Turkey supports their economy by providing an annual grant to the Turkish Cypriot administration.
Despite this, it would be wrong to assume that the Turkish Cypriots have no control over their own affairs. For many years, Rauf Denktash, the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader, wielded considerable influence in Turkey, so much that few politicians in Turkey would stand up to him.”
“In addition to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities there are three other constitutionally recognised groups living in Cyprus: the Maronites, Armenians, and Latins. There is also a small, but officially unrecognised, Gypsy community.
Altogether, these groups made up the remaining 4 percent of the population, after the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, at the time of independence. Under the 1960 constitution, they are formally recognised as religious minorities rather than as ‘communities’, and are each entitled to send one member to the House of Representatives who may vote on matters directly affecting their communities. To ensure that they would not be prevented from having a full say in the political process, all three religious groups were also asked to decide which of the two communities they wished to be a part of for participating in presidential and parliamentary elections. All three opted to be linked with the Greek Cypriot community.”
“The smallest of the three religious communities, the Latins, number just a few hundred. They are the descendants of the Venetians, who ruled the island before the Ottoman conquest in 1571. They are Roman Catholic and can often be recognized by their Italian-sounding surnames.”
Colonization
“After the Turkish War (1877 – 78), during which the Ottoman Empire lost several eastern provinces, the European powers gathered for the Congress of Berlin. There the map of the Balkans was redrawn. With Russian support, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania all became independent states. However, in an attempt to prevent further Russian aggression, Constantinople entered into an agreement with London to allow Britain to occupy and administer Cyprus. This agreement, known as the Cyprus Convention, was purely strategic in nature. In return for control of the island, London promised that it would help repel any future Russian attack on the Ottoman Empire’s eastern provinces. For Britain, the convention was extremely beneficial geopolitically. Cyprus provided a useful base for ships travelling through the Suez Canal to India, Britain’s most important colonial possession. Crucially, the agreement was only temporary. It stipulated that if Moscow returned the territories captured during the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War, Britain would hand back Cyprus to full Ottoman rule.”
“Reforms were instituted that laid the foundations for democracy in Cyprus. For example, elections were held for new bodies, such as the Legislative Council, that had some influence on local and Cyprus wide administration. At the same time, the British authorities decided not to exercise direct control over the educational system, allowing Greek and Turkish-language schools to exist. Also, Greek- and Turkish-language newspapers began to emerge. However, there was another side to the arrangement. Under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, Britain had to pay a fixed annual sum to the Ottoman authorities. This was raised by taxation from the Cypriots themselves, who were also forced to pay for the costs of British administration. This ‘tribute’ hindered the island’s economic development and contributed to resentment towards British rule.
Following the Ottoman Empire’s decision to side with Germany at the start of the First World War, Britain’s relationship with Cyprus changed dramatically. London annexed the island. In 1915, the following year, in a bid to induce Greece to join the war, London came close to granting the Greek Cypriots their wish and offered the island to Athens. Though the proposal was supported by Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, it was rejected by the Greek king, Constantine I, who was determined to keep Greece out of the war. In the decade that followed, Britain strengthened its control over Cyprus. In 1923, under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, the new Republic of Turkey, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, formally relinquished its claims to the island and called on Turkish Cypriots to leave the island and settle in Turkey. Few heeded the call. Appalled at living conditions in Anatolia at the time and effectively prevented from leaving Cyprus by a largely unaffordable departure levy imposed by British authorities who did not want them to leave, most stayed where they were. On 10 March 1925, Britain formally declared Cyprus a Crown colony.
The removal of these last vestiges of formal Ottoman or Turkish sovereignty over the island led to renewed calls for enosis from the Greek Cypriots, But Britain continued to reject this idea, further angering the Creek Cypriot community. In 1931, Greek Cypriot frustrations reached the boiling point.
Violent riots broke out, and the headquarters of the British administration on the island, the Government House, was burned down. The colonial authorities responded with measures designed to prevent similar incidents. These included a ban on flying the Greek flag, the prohibition of political parties, and increased censorship of the press. While these certainly limited public expressions of support for enosis, it did little to dampen pro-union sentiment. And while nationalist activity was put on hold during the Second World War, during which time the Greek Cypriots expressed loyalty to the British Empire in the hope that this would later be rewarded, as soon as the conflict came to an end there were renewed calls for Cyprus to unite with Greece. London, although now willing to examine the possibilities for some form of self-rule, nevertheless remained adamant that it would not relinquish its sovereignty over the island.
On 15 January 1950, the Ethnarchy Council, the Church-led supreme leadership of the Greek Cypriot community, held an islandwide unofficial referendum on the question of enosis.
The result was near-unanimous support for enosis: about 96 percent of participating Greek Cypriots wished to see Cyprus and Greece unite.”
“The prospect of a civil war between the two communities looked increasingly likely, which in turn could lead to conflict between Greece and Turkey. A war between Athens and Ankara-INO NATO allies-could have catastrophic consequences because it would open the way for the Soviet Union to extend its control in the eastern Mediterranean. It was against this backdrop that in September 1958, Makarios announced that independence, rather than enosis, would be an acceptable solution for Cyprus. This paved the way for a meeting between representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments in Zürich in January 1959. There they agreed to endorse the creation of an independent state with powers divided between the Greek and Turkish communities living on the island.
This decision was confirmed the following month at a second conference held in London, which also included representatives from Britain and the two Cypriot communities. On 16 August 1960, a year and a half after the Zürich-London Agreements were first signed, the British flag was lowered, and the Republic of Cyprus officially came into being.”
“The new Republic of Cyprus had a complex constitutional structure that was specifically designed to balance power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in a way that would prevent the numerically much smaller Turkish Cypriot population from being sidelined by Greek Cypriots.
At the top of the system, power was divided between the president, who would be elected by the Greek Cypriot community , and the vice president, who would be elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. They would each have significant veto rights over bills and proposals. They would also preside over the Council of Ministers. This would be made up of seven Greek Cypriot ministers and three Turkish Cypriot ministers (one of whom would hold a major appointment — defence, foreign affairs, or finance). This 70:30 ratio between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was also the basis for power sharing in other institutions, including the civil service and the single-chamber House of Representatives, the new state’s parliament. (The one exception was in the armed forces, where the ratio would be 60:40.) In the case of the judiciary, the supreme constitutional court, the highest judicial body in the state, was made up of a Greek Cypriot judge, a Turkish Cypriot judge, and a neutral (foreign) judge, who would serve as the president of the court.
In addition to the central government institutions, separate communal chambers were also established with responsibility over issues under the direct control of the two communities, such as educational, cultural, and religious matters.
The separation of the two communities was rigorously enforced under the political system. For example, in the event that the president was unable to carry out his duties or was absent from the island, he would be replaced by the president of the Greek Cypriot communal chamber. Likewise, if the vice president was incapacitated, his duties would be performed by the president of the Turkish Cypriot chamber. It was also notable that the new structures ensured that the two communities would retain strong ties with their respective ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey. For example, the Greek and Turkish flags would be flown alongside the Cypriot flag on government buildings, and most of the holidays would be based on Greek and Turkish national holidays, many of which were religious in nature.”
“The reactions of the 2 communities to independence were different. By and large, the Greek Cypriot community greeted independence with a mixture of emotions ranging from indifference to outright hostility. For the large majority of Greek Cypriots, independence was regarded as a bitter defeat. The new state commanded little if any of their loyalty. Indeed, many regarded independence as a temporary measure, to be tolerated until circumstances changed and Cyprus could formally become a part of Greece. This general desire for unification was felt not only among the people but also by the Greek Cypriot leaders, including Archbishop Makarios, the island’s first president. Despite the constitutional prohibitions on enosis and taksim, many times he publicly stated his wish to see Cyprus unite with Greece. The generally negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot community towards the new republic was further compounded by the significant powers that had been given to the Turkish Cypriot community under the constitution. Most Greek Cypriots deeply resented the fact that not only had they been denied enosis, they had also been forced to have to share power with a community that represented less than one-fifth of the population.
In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots were largely in favoured the new republic. They recognized that they had been given significant say in the governance of the state and that their position on the island was protected by Turkey. And while they may have also harboured a degree of resentment that their hopes for partition had not been realized, they nevertheless knew that things could have been much worse. Though they were not to be a part of Turkey, neither were they a part of Greece. To this extent, the view of the Turkish Cypriots towards the new state should be read as one of relative ambivalence. Like the Greek Cypriots, they had little intrinsic loyalty to the new state. But as far as second-best options went, it represented a relatively good outcome. And there were many
within the community who believed that the new state of affairs was temporary. Given that the Greek Cypriots still wanted to pursue enosis and that Turkey might (they thought) still step in to divide the island, many Turkish Cypriots continued to believe that the Republic of Cyprus could not, or would not, last. They saw taksim as a real possibility.”
“The most significant area of disagreement between the two communities — and the one l that’s most widely blamed for the constitutional collapse — concerned the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipalities in the main towns and cities of the island. These were supposed to be established following independence. As not all Turkish Cypriots lived in separate parts of the towns, however, they proved very difficult to implement. As a result, the Greek Cypriot leadership suggested that unified Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipalities be established initially. Following this, and when feasible, steps could be taken to create ethnically separate municipalities. The Turkish Cypriots insisted that separate municipalities first be established. Once this had happened, steps could be taken to examine and rectify any problems that arose.”
“After more than a year of negotiations between the two communities over municipalities, President Makarios decided that the issue could be resolved only by introducing a much broader range of constitutional amendments that would alter the relationship between the two communities and, in his opinion, enable the smoother running of the government. Of course, such ideas were extremely risky.”
1963
“Less than two weeks after the proposed amendments were presented, Turkey rejected them. Despite assurances given by Makarios that the amendments were solely designed to promote a smoother working of the constitution, the plans severely undermined Turkish Cypriot political power in the Republic of Cyprus. After Ankara’s decision, tensions rapidly arose between the two communities. On 21 December, 1963, tempers boiled over when some Turkish Cypriots were stopped at a late-night Greek Cypriot roadblock in Nicosia.
Within hours, large numbers of Turkish Cypriots had taken to the streets of the capital to protest. This in turn led to violent clashes with Greek Cypriots. Very soon, armed confrontations were reported in other towns, such as Limassol and Kyrenia. Days later, the violence had spread across the whole island. In the months that followed, the fighting continued, and many people were forced from their homes, sometimes as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing.”
“Nicos Sampson, a former BOKA gunman who had taken part in attacks against Turkish Cypriots in 1964 and was a known supporter of union between Greece and Cyprus, took over as the head of the Cypriot administration.
Sampson’s appointment as the head of the Greek military-backed administration in Cyprus left many observers with little doubt that a declaration of enosis was imminent. The Turkish government started planning its response. Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister, flew to London to see if Britain would be willing to intervene jointly under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. The British government declined, arguing that it was ill prepared for such a major action. Ecevit therefore decided that the Turkish armed forces would have to act on their own. He ordered a full-scale invasion of the island.
Just after 6 o’clock in the morning, on 20 July 1974, Turkish fighter planes began bombing strategic locations near Nicosia, and paratroops were dropped along the Kyrenia mountain range. An hour later, the first boatloads of Turkish soldiers landed on the northern shores of the island. Working in conjunction with the Turkish Cypriot militias, they attempted to establish a corridor linking the coast with the Turkish Cypriot suburbs of Nicosia, in the centre of the island. Putting up stiff resistance, the Greek Cypriot National Guard managed to slow their advance. However, they could not stop it. Within two days, the Turkish Army had managed to establish a meagre, but nevertheless secure, foothold on the island.
Internationally, the invasion prompted a strong response. Both the United States and Britain issued statements condemning Turkey’s actions but harshly criticising the Greek military administration for precipitating the crisis. At the
United Nations, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for the immediate end of foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all forces other than those covered by the relevant treaties. Meanwhile, the successful Turkish invasion led to turmoil in Athens. On 23 July, the military junta collapsed and was replaced by a civilian government under Constantine Karamanlis, a veteran Greek statesman. Likewise, Sampson was forced to step down.”
“On 14 August the second wave of the invasion began. Fanning out east and west from the narrow wedge of territory they had captured in the first round of fighting, Turkish forces rapidly overran most of the north of the island as tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots fled their homes. The United Nations Security Council passed several more resolutions deploring the fighting and calling on all parties to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, but Ankara continued with its operation. In the end, it took three days to put in place a new — this time, permanent — cease-fire. By then Turkey had captured 36 percent of the island.”
“The invasion and division of the island had a profound effect in both communities. But for the Greek Cypriots the effects were particularly catastrophic. The Turkish military operation left thousands dead or wounded and many more missing. In recent years the UN Committee for Missing Persons has worked to identify the remains of many who went missing, but more than a thousand have yet to be accounted for. In addition, many Greek Cypriots- those living along the entire north coast; along the Karpas peninsula; and in Varosha, the predominantly Greek Cypriot region of the eastern port city of Famagusta-were forced to leave their homes. In total, approximately 160,000 people were displaced.
At the same time, the invasion had disastrous consequences for the economy. Statistics provided by the Government of Cyprus show that the invasion led to a 70 percent drop in the gross output of the country and a 30 percent rise in unemployment. Important farming areas — such as Morphou, the home of the island’s citrus industry — were now under Turkish and Turkish Cypriot control as was most of the island’s tourism accommodation. Just under half of industrial production, and over half of all mining output was also gone. The important port of Famagusta was lost, as was the main international airport in Nicosia, which was now in the UN-controlled buffer zone. In human terms the effects were profound. A report produced by the University of Cyprus in July 2010 estimates that the total value of Greek Cypriot private land (not government land or church property) in the north is US $82.1 billion at 2009 prices. The loss of earnings from the lack of access to this land has been put at US $15.78 billion.
For the Turkish Cypriots, the effects of the Turkish intervention were more positive. Throughout the 1960s they had been in a rather precarious position. Since the outbreak of intercommunal fighting, large numbers had been living in enclaves under an effective state of siege. Greek Cypriot forces had at times even prevented food and medicine from getting through. Now, however, they were in control of a large portion of the island. In the months after the invasion around fifty thousand Turkish Cypriots who had been living in the south relocated to the areas under Turkish and Turkish Cypriot control in the north. To house them, the Turkish Cypriot authorities expropriated the abandoned Greek Cypriot properties and redistributed them to Turkish Cypriots. (For the sake of comparison, the same University of Cyprus report estimated that during the period 1974–1997 Turkish Cypriots’ losses from the lack of use of their land in the south were US S2.2 billion.) Meanwhile, starting shortly after the invasion, settlers from mainland Turkey began arriving on the island. They, too, were given Greek Cypriot properties.”
The Division
“In the years immediately following the high-level agreements, the United Nations continued its efforts to broker a settlement, but without success. While the two sides may have agreed in principle to reunification under a federal system, they remained far apart in terms of the practical elements of such a system. This deadlock was only magnified when, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot administration, in a surprise move, unilaterally declared independence. While the Turkish government quickly announced that it recognised the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), as the new entity was called, the Turkish Cypriot decision was roundly condemned by the international community. Meeting just days later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 541, which stated that the declaration was legally invalid and should be withdrawn. It also instructed UN members to continue to recognise the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as the only internationally recognised state on the island. The TRNC has subsequently not been recognised by any state apart from Turkey.
Quite why the Turkish Cypriots chose to declare independence has never been fully answered. In large part, it appears to have reflected the personal ambition of Rauf Denktash, the hard-line separatist Turkish Cypriot leader, to be the founder of a Turkish Cypriot state. As it was always unlikely that the move would be recognised by the international community, it seems as if the decision was shaped more by personal vanity than by a desire to do what was best for the Turkish Cypriot people. Indeed, many Turkish Cypriots strongly opposed the move, realising that it would ultimately harm reunification efforts and undermine any international support that they might have had. As for timing, this is an easier question to answer. The decision was directly linked to political events in Turkey, which was currently in the process of making a transition from military to civilian rule. It seemed unlikely that the new Turkish government under Turgut Ozal, who was known as a pro-Western moderniser, would have agreed to allow the declaration of independence because of the possibility that it would leave Turkey diplomatically isolated on the world stage.”
The EU
“It was a watershed moment. By judging that Mrs Loizidou remained the lawful owner of her property and that Turkey could be held financially liable for such claims, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had opened the way for lawsuits from every other Greek Cypriot refugee. The political and financial costs of such litigation would be enormous. Ankara therefore decided to reject the ruling, even though the European Union required compliance with ECHR rulings as a basic requirement for membership.”
“Although the Loizidou ruling was a serious setback for Turkey, a far more significant development was the decision of the Greek Cypriots to apply for membership to the European Union. The island’s relationship with the EU began in the early 1960s, when Cyprus first applied for an association agreement. Although this initial application was retracted, a two-stage agreement was eventually signed in December 1972. According to the terms of the deal, in the first phase tariffs on a range of goods would be reduced. This would then lead to the second stage, a full customs union between Cyprus and the EU by 1982. Although the Turkish invasion of the island threw these plans into disarray, an additional protocol, signed in May 1987, subsequently paved the way for a full customs union by 2002. However, this was no longer enough for the Greek Cypriots. On 4 July 1990, and acting with the support of both Britain and Greece, which had become a member in 1981, the Cypriot government under President George Vassiliou formally applied for membership in the union.
The announcement came at the right time. With the Cold War at an end, the European Union was already starting to consider the possibility of a major expansion, and Cyprus was certainly seen to be a part of Europe.”
“The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were furious at the decision. From the outset, they had both been strongly opposed to any move to accept Cyprus as a candidate for EU membership. In the main, their response was driven by fear. Both realised that were Cyprus to join the European Union it would almost certainly have an extremely negative effect on Turkey’s own hopes of joining. The Turkish government had submitted an application for full membership three years before Cyprus, in 1987. The EU was initially unwilling to grant it formal candidacy — a decision based on a range of factors, including concerns about its political and human rights records and opposition by some member states to admitting such a large Muslim state. It now seemed possible that Cyprus would join before Turkey, and there was a real danger that it would then block Turkey’s membership to try to force a solution.
Given these concerns, Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots mounted a strong campaign to prevent Cyprus from joining the European Union.”
“Formal accession negotiation started between the European Union and Cyprus in 1998. Nevertheless, the Turkish government continued to believe that there was no chance that the European Union would risk provoking a crisis with Turkey, a major state of 60 million people, in favour of eight hundred thousand Greek Cypriots. Denktash, meanwhile, was still adamant that any solution in Cyprus be based on the sovereign equality of the two communities. By late 2001, however, it was clear that the European Union was not going to back down in the face of threats. In a last ploy to try to delay EU accession, Denktash called for new talks with his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Glafcos Clerides. The Turkish Cypriot leader, fully supported by a nationalist government in Turkey, appeared to believe that if the talks appeared to go well, the EU would reconsider its position.
In November 2002 everything changed. In Turkey, the AKP Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Announcing that his primary policy goal was to see Turkey join the EU, Erdogan emphasised his wish to solve the Cyprus issue lt was a monumental breakthrough, and the UN quickly seized on by presenting the two sides with a blueprint for a settlement the Punan Plan, named after Kofi Annan, the secretary general
The hope was that a deal could be reached before the all-important 1 May 2004, meeting of EU leaders in Copenhagen, at which Cyprus would likely be formally invited to join the EU, along with Malta and eight states from central Europe. As had happened so many times in the past, no progress was made. Recuperating from major heart surgery, Denktash declined to meet with his Greek Cypriot counterpart or engage in meaningful talks.
Even growing pressure from within his community, which included massive street demonstrations, had little effect. Denktash remained as intransigent as ever. In a last-ditch effort to reach a settlement, Annan met with the two Cypriot leaders in The Hague and called upon them to put the latest version of the plan directly to the people in simultaneous referenda. While the idea was grudgingly accepted by Tassos Papadopoulos, a hard-line nationalist who had recently replaced the moderate Clerides as president, Denktash said no. The UN then brought its peacemaking efforts to a close. A couple of weeks later, on 16 April 2003, the Cypriot government, along with Malta and eight central and eastern European states, formally signed the treaty guaranteeing them EU membership in May 2004.”
Opening The Green Line
“In the weeks that followed, the Turkish Cypriot leader was heavily criticised for killing off yet another peace process. Turkey also received a clear warning that as a result of the Turkish Cypriot leader’s behaviour, its own efforts to join the EU would be obstructed. In an attempt to deflect some of this criticism, the Turkish Cypriot authorities made the completely unexpected announcement that they had decided to end the thirty-year restrictions on travel across the Green Line dividing the north and south of the island. Greek Cypriots would now be able to cross over at will as long as they showed their passport and filled in a visa slip.
Instead of welcoming the news, the Papadopoulos administration announced that it would be ‘unthinkable’ for Greek Cypriots to give validity to the Turkish Cypriot authorities by doing so. The administration was wrong. On the first day the border opened, 23 April 2003, an estimated five thousand people crossed the line. As word spread that the Green Line had really opened, the number of people crossing skyrocketed. In some places the Turkish Cypriot
authorities could not handle the volume of people waiting to cross the line. The numbers were staggering: by early afternoon on Easter Monday, 28 April, more than fourteen thousand Greek Cypriots had crossed over at the three checkpoints that had been opened. Indeed, at one crossing the queue of vehicles stretched back 8 miles as anxious Greek Cypriot refugees waited in line to return to the North and see the homes they lost thirty years earlier. Within two weeks, two hundred thousand people — a quarter of the island’s population — had crossed over, according to estimates. Perhaps most important, the atmosphere remained very good throughout. Despite the vast number of people crossing over and the dire predictions of intercommunal violence, there were almost no serious incidents. Indeed, it appeared as though all were doing their best to try to foster as positive an atmosphere as possible.”
The Future
“Both sides readily accept that any solution will mean a transfer of territory from the Turkish Cypriots, who currently control 36 percent of the island, to the Greek Cypriots. Usual estimates suggest that the amount returned will be 8–11 percent of the island’s total territory. In other words, the size of the Turkish Cypriot entity will be 26–29 percent of the island. But perhaps more important than the question of the amount of territory to be returned to the Greek Cypriots is the question of which areas will be relinquished by the Turkish Cypriots. Linked to territory, one of the key issues for the Greek Cypriots is the question of refugee returns. A central aim for the Greek Cypriot leadership in all the negotiations has been to ensure that as many refugees as possible are able to return to their homes and that as many of those homes as possible be in Greek Cypriot-controlled areas. For this reason, attention has most usually focused on ensuring that the towns of Morphou and Famagusta are returned to Greek Cypriot control. Estimates suggest that the return of these two areas would be sufficient to ensure that the majority of the Greek Cypriots displaced in 1974 would be able to return to their properties and be under Greek Cypriot administration. They are both, therefore, considered to be vital to a settlement.
A more difficult question concerns two other areas: Kyrenia, on the north coast, and the Karpas Peninsula, the famous Cyprus panhandle that juts out to the east of the island. By almost all reckoning, Kyrenia will not be returned to Greek Cypriot control. Even though it had the largest proportion of Greek Cypriots of all the towns on the island prior to the invasion (there were more Greeks in Kyrenia as a percentage of the entire population than in Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca, or Famagusta), it is right in the middle of Turkish Cypriot-controlled territory. It is therefore extremely difficult to see how the Turkish Cypriots would ever be willing to give it up.”
“While the freedom of movement is now accepted by both sides, freedom of settlement remains highly controversial. Once again, it relates closely to the question of bizonality and bicommunality, For the Greek Cypriots, the right to live where he wants is extremely important and should not be subject to initiations. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, want some restrictions. It is one thing to allow everyone to move freely around the island. It is something quite different to allow people to settle at will where they want; it could well lead to large numbers of Greek Cypriots moving into the Turkish Cypriot federal state.
The Annan Plan contained provisions limiting the number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots able to settle in the two constituent states. This was a deeply unpopular measure among Greek Cypriots, even though it was suggested by some observers that the provisions would almost certainly have meant that any Greek Cypriot who wanted to return home could do so. After all, few Greek Cypriots refugees appeared to want to give up their new lives, jobs, and friends to return to homes that they had left almost forty years previously. Moreover, their children, who had never lived in the north, would be even less inclined to do so. But it was the principle that mattered. Many Greek Cypriots fundamentally object to the idea of any restriction on the right of people to settle. Even though it seems likely that even fewer Greek Cypriots would now want to return to the north in the event of a settlement, many Greek Cypriots believe that the principle of the freedom of settlement is as important as the practical application of that right. It is therefore likely that the issue of freedom of settlement will continue to play a major role in discussions.”
“Conventional wisdom suggests that a solution will come about only if Turkey receives a clear promise of EU membership.
Otherwise, the thinking goes, there will simply be no incentive for Ankara to withdraw its forces from the island and put pressure on the Turkish Cypriots to play a constructive part in securing an agreement with the Greek Cypriots. Those who defend this view often note that Turkish support for the Amar Plan was directly linked to its wish for EU membership.
While such thinking was, until recently, the standard view of the situation — no EU membership, no solution — there are signs that that this may be changing. A far more interesting picture is emerging that sees a link between Turkey’s EU membership and a Cyprus solution but does not make one dependent upon the other. In recent years, Turkey has sought to increase its profile on the world stage. To do this, the Turkish government has actively pursued a policy of détente with its neighbours — the ‘Zero Problems’ policy. Over the past decade, Turkey has made efforts to repair or improve relations with Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. More recently, steps have even been taken to address the long-standing animosity between Turkey and Armenia. Cyprus remains the last major issue to be tackled. Once it is out of the way, then Turkey can concentrate on consolidating its reputation as a regional leader and a major international actor. This in turn could make Turkey more attractive as a prospective member of the EU. In this sense, while many in Turkey — including important elements within the military and foreign policy establishment — still believe that a solution to the Cyprus Problem should depend on EU accession, many others believe that resolving the issue would be beneficial for Turkey in a far wider sense.”
“In the absence of any prospect for a settlement, the question frequently arises as to whether the continuation of the status quo is perhaps the best outcome. The current situation can continue indefinitely. After all, there is no conflict on the island. However, it should also be recognised that as time passes the present stalemate is likely to become less and less appealing for both sides. First, as Turkey seeks to move closer to the European Union and consolidate its position on the world stage, it is ever more apparent that Cyprus represents an ongoing obstacle to these ambitions. Second, the increase in the number of lawsuits brought by Greek Cypriot property owners for loss of the use of their property is likely to become ever more costly for Turkey, which will have to compensate the owners or face the legal, political, and financial consequences of failing to do so — a situation
reaffirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in early 2010. Worse, a major court case — the Orams case — has opened the way for claims for compensation to be made in the courts in the south against anyone occupying Greek Cypriot properties in the north. More important, now that Cyprus is a member of the EU, these judgements can be enforced across the entire European Union. Looking ahead, this form of ‘lawfare’, as it has been called, is likely to get even worse. Even ordinary tourists to the north could start to face fines for staying in hotels, or even eating at restaurants, that are built on Greek Cypriot land. Such a scenario is not unrealistic. The Greek Cypriot lawyer who won the Orams case has already said that a case against tourists will be his next target. If this succeeds, it could have a catastrophic effect on the Turkish Cypriot economy, which is already reeling after the collapse in property prices. To this extent, it is clear that the current status quo is not in the interest of either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots.”
“With every passing year, the number of Turkish settlers in the north increases. This is already having a profound effect on the Turkish Cypriot community, which is well on its way to becoming a minority to the mainland Turkish settlers. For the Greek Cypriots it means that if a solution does occur, they will not be uniting with the Turkish Cypriots, but with a predominantly Turkish entity in the north. The bonds of common heritage and shared culture — what little effect that it might have — will not be there at all. This will make cooperation in a postconflict Cyprus significantly more difficult. But even at a day-to-day level, the effects of the division are being felt more acutely. Since the opening of the Green Line in April 2003, many Turkish Cypriots have made use of the benefits of their Cypriot citizenship to claim various benefits, such as free hospital treatment, from Cypriot state. This is on top of the gains, such as freedom of movement around Europe, they have made since Cyprus joined the EU. However, they are not taxpayers. This has led to resentment among many Greek Cypriots and to comments from at least one prominent Greek Cypriot political figure suggesting that perhaps partition would be the most logical and desirable outcome.”
“Although there is much anger and bitterness within the Greek Cypriot community about the events of 1974, there is also a growing sense of pragmatism. In private, many Greek Cypriois have their doubts about efforts to reunite the island. In moderate circles, some appear to have concluded that the north is all but lost for good and that maybe it is time to open up discussions on a formal separation. Such an agreement would be based on the return of a certain proportion of territory to the Greek Cypriots (and compensation for properties not returned) in return for the Greek Cypriots’ recognising the north and, ideally, allowing it to join the European Union. This type of land-for-peace deal would in many ways make sense, especially if linked to Turkish Cypriot accession to the EU.
Many Greek Cypriot nationalists appear to be reaching the same conclusion. Having come to terms with the fact that a bizonal, bicommunal federation is the only option available, and appalled with what this means in real terms, they realize that it might be better to keep the Republic of Cyprus as it is — a Greek Cypriot-controlled entity. While there is a certain degree of logic to this point of view, this argument seems unlikely to enter the mainstream of political debate anytime soon. No politician would want to be the first to come out with this view, even if it does reflect a far wider strand of thinking than outsiders generally realise. Therefore, while partition might represent a logical solution, at least from some perspectives, it seems likely that negotiations will continue to focus on reunification for the foreseeable future.”
